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
THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY CALCULUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

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Thomas-Durell Young

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Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute

Enclosure

THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY CALCULUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Thomas-Durell Young

January 3, 1991

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FOREWORD

The European security environment has been fundamentally changed by the events of the past 18 months. While almost inconceivable just a few years ago, the cold war has indeed passed from the scene. The Soviet Union, until recently feared and perceived as a credible and cohesive military and political threat to Western interests, is in the midst of massive internal reform, and its empire in Central and Eastern Europe is but a shadow of its former self. The Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany unified on October 3, 1990, under the provisions of Bonn's democratic constitution, signifying one of the greatest political victories for the Western Alliance since its inception. But in victory also comes uncertainty about the future and pressures for the revision of tried and tested common approaches and institutions.

While considerable attention has been focused on how the United States and NATO are to deal with these changes in Europe, there has been little if any discussion in the press or academic fora as to the impact on the U.S. Army of these new altered security realities. After all, one should recall that the U.S. Seventh Army in Germany has been the central focus of deterrence and symbol of the U.S. commitment to NATO for over 40 years. Now that the principal threat against which the U.S. Army has planned, trained and prepared for war has receded, just where does the U.S. Army fit in the future European security environment?

To answer this important question, the Strategic Studies Institute initiated this individual study in the spring of 1990. Its author, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, no stranger to Europe, spent 9 weeks in Europe conducting field research. Dr. Young's thesis is that there is indeed a key role for the U.S. Army to play in the future in Europe, but only if it is willing to change, both in regard to its structures, as well as its corporate attitudes.

The author would like to express his sincere gratitude for the assistance he received in the preparation of this study from Colonel Karl Lowe, with whom he co-authored an earlier Strategic Studies Institute study on multinational corps in NATO, from which Appendix A was drawn. In addition, Colonels John J. Hickey, Robert Ulin, and Peter Dauber provided excellent substantive and editorial advice on early drafts of this manuscript. The author has greatly benefited from their expertise and understanding of European affairs.

As an army, we are on the threshold of a new era which will require us to adapt to new roles and missions in Europe, as well as to a dramatically different global security environment. I am certain that this study provides some useful and thought-provoking insights into how to resolve the challenges the U.S. Army now faces in Europe.



KARL W. ROBINSON
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SUMMARY

The military withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Central and Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have been accompanied by the recurrence of the perennial "spoiler" in the European security calculus, the presence of a unified Germany. Thus, the security landscape in Europe has been fundamentally altered, both in terms of the military threat and the internal cohesiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance. The October 3, 1990 unification of Germany has produced a nascent European superpower that has yet to be fully accepted by its allies and neighbors as benign in its foreign intentions. Given these far-reaching developments in Europe, it is little wonder that long-standing Western security institutions, strategy, force deployments, and doctrinal concepts have come under intense scrutiny.

This study, which assesses the implications of these ongoing changes in Europe for the U.S. Army, is premised upon three major assumptions. These are (1) the successful conclusion and ratification of the CFE reduction treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, (2) the dissolution of the latter collective defense organization, and (3) the continued diminution of the Soviet conventional military threat to Central and Western Europe.

This study argues that while Washington should reassess the utility of NATO in achieving U.S. vital interests in Europe, NATO's value is not in doubt during the mid-term, from the perspective of U.S. diplomatic and security objectives and relevance to Western strategy. As Europe evolves toward a post-cold war security structure, within which "ein Deutschland" will surely dominate politically and economically, the stabilizing effects of NATO are incalculable. At some point, however, the need for this stabilization will end and a more fluid regional political structure will emerge, hopefully within the confines of an economically and politically integrated Western Europe, thereby militating against the renationalization of

European defense policies. The principal means by which the United States will assist its NATO allies in accomplishing the task of stabilizing Europe during this period of uncertainty will be through the continued deployment of U.S. Army forces to Europe, *albeit* in radically different formations and with different missions.

The premise of this study is that the United States must base its European policy upon keeping the Federal Republic of Germany within the Western Alliance and Western European economic and political institutions. This will require adept diplomacy and the restructuring of U.S. Army and allied forces stationed on German soil. Overwhelming consideration must be given to avoid "singularizing" the Federal Republic. This can only be accomplished through the spreading of the Western defense burden. In consequence, multinational corps should be raised by NATO on German territory to replace current allied forward force deployments. Rapid reaction forces of corps size should also be organized by NATO for in-theater, extra-regional and disaster relief operations. Where appropriate, these formations should be stationed in European countries other than the Federal Republic. Given the historical sensitivity of out-of-area operations in the NATO Alliance in lieu of attempting to build universal consensus on this divisive issue, Washington may wish to approach individually selected allies to conduct bilateral exercises and possibly engage in planning for such operations.

In an increasingly environmentally concerned Europe, the U.S. Army should also plan to conduct more of its large-scale field exercises in North America, as well as invite its European allies to utilize these state-of-the-art facilities. As the U.S. Army diminishes in size, the use of these maneuver areas by our allies will further justify their retention, as well as encourage interoperability in terms of doctrine, threats, and common experiences. The political sensitivities of our German allies to the Army's current exercise tempo will surely have a dampening effect on the Army's readiness in Europe, and in consequence, the Army needs to begin to plan for acceptable alternatives.

As the European security debate becomes progressively more political and less military, the roles to be played by the U.S. Army in Europe will perforce evolve to accommodate this new reality. These new roles will require the U.S. Army to alter fundamentally the way it has approached its traditional mission in Europe and the manner by which officers have been trained. The new European security environment will require an officer corps that is multilingual and better educated in regional political and security affairs. For example, comprehensive knowledge of the provisions of arms control treaties and CSBM arrangements will be a *sine qua non* for U.S. Army officers if they hope to protect and further U.S. vital interests in Europe. If the U.S. Army adapts to these new realities, its future involvement in Europe will be assured.

THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY CALCULUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

It will never be possible to stop Germany from wanting to be One state and One nation; the inclination, if not towards unity, at least towards some kind of association remains . . . in every heart and mind.

Wilhelm von Humboldt
ca.1815

Introduction.

On November 11, 1989, the die was irreversibly cast that produced the resolution of the cold war between the Eastern and Western blocs in Europe. Following the opening of the Berlin Wall by East German authorities, the existing post-war European security structure was attacked by pundits as being irrelevant and in need of fundamental change.¹ Thus, 40 year-old institutions, strategy, military force structure, and doctrine were made archaic, according to some.² From the perspective of the United States, the end of the cold war has presented U.S. policymakers with almost insurmountable challenges. While often conveniently forgotten, the one luxury afforded to Washington and brought about by the cold war was that key, nettlesome political issues resulting from the ending of the Second World War, such as those relating to the future of a unified Germany, were placed on hold. For 40 years, the perennial "spoiler" in the European security calculus, the German "Question" or "Problem" (depending upon one's perspective), was conveniently ignored.³ The unification of the two Germanies and the evident abandonment by the Soviets of their European empire have produced a situation whereby the cold war balance of power has been altered so that some new regional security regime is clearly required. Even in the European Community (EC), the previous "balance of imbalances" among its four key countries with comparable populations (i.e., France, the Federal Republic, Britain, and

Italy), now no longer exists.⁴ What makes the issue so potentially difficult for the United States at the moment is that it must orchestrate this metamorphosis in the existing alliance system, not as the unquestioned leader of the victorious World War Two allies, but rather only as the *primus inter pares*.

What European security requires is the creation of a new geopolitical balance, not unlike the product of the Vienna Congress of 1815, which perforce must be centered around "ein Deutschland."⁵ It should not be overlooked that the October 3, 1990, unification of the two Germanies produced a nascent superpower that will surely dominate Western Europe, in spite of the financial challenges currently facing the Federal Republic to redevelop the former Democratic Republic's infrastructure and economy.⁶ Nonetheless, in political terms, Bonn has become the prime political and economic power in non-Russian Europe.

It should not be surprising then that the Federal Republic's principal Western European allies, France and the United Kingdom, initially expressed disquiet over the long-term potential for greater economic and political domination of the EC by Germany.⁷ France, for instance, since Cardinal Richelieu's famous memorandum on Germany, has historically taken a very keen interest in developments across the Rhine, and has cultivated an intimate diplomatic relationship with Bonn since the 1950s, with Paris as the accepted "senior" partner. Yet, as witnessed by events, neither London nor Paris had the necessary influence to affect visibly German unification.⁸ While they will not be irrelevant to the emerging European security calculus (particularly with their nuclear forces),⁹ France and the United Kingdom will progressively become less influential in a Europe with a unified Germany occupying a new and increasingly powerful economic and political position. It is little wonder, therefore, that European states, East and West, have expressed an almost unanimous opinion holding that the United States remain militarily engaged in Europe. For example, the continued American and Canadian presence in Europe, argues Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, could prevent the renationalization of

European security structures.¹⁰ A Europe with one Germany, without a U.S. military presence legitimizing Washington's diplomatic status, would mean that Bonn would dominate regional affairs: an eventuality Europeans, in general and understandably in view of their historical experience in the 20th century, want to avoid.

Thus, as the leader of the Western Alliance and as the sole possible state which can play the difficult role of an *interrex*, the United States must take the lead in constructing this new security system in Europe. "Construct" is defined in this sense as representing the security and diplomatic interests of all interested parties in Europe in such a way that a system is created which is accepted as legitimate, thereby increasing the outlook for the region's stability in the long term. If American diplomatic leadership fails in achieving this ambitious, if not intellectually Herculean effort, then a recurrence of the unpleasant Versailles Treaty experience is possible. While hyperbole may be present in the analogy of Hercules's Twelve Labors paling in comparison with those challenges which face the United States, the complexity of the many issues involved is very real, indeed. If anything is certain at this point it is that the United States will only be able to achieve its, and the Western Alliance's, security objectives on the "Old Continent" by creative thinking and questioning long-held maxims. Consequently, from the perspective of the United States in general and the U.S. Army in particular, new strategies, altered force structures and revised basing schemes must be considered if the full political value of forward deployed U.S. forces is to be realized.

The purpose of this study is to assess the implications and outlook for the United States and the U.S. Army emanating from the new European security calculus as they relate to five key issues: the nature of the new regional security and political balance; arms control; institutional metamorphosis; NATO's strategy dilemma; and, U.S. force structure options. It will be argued that the process of German unification necessitates a cold, calculated, and emotionless assessment of the new realities which will govern the future regional security order.

Because this assessment deals with the mid- to long term, it is predicated on three major assumptions. These are the successful ratification and implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) reduction treaty and conclusion of the CFE follow-on accord between the states of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact; the dissolution of the latter collective defense organization; and, the continued diminution in the Soviet military threat to Central and Western Europe. Admittedly it could be argued that the achievement of all of these is problematic and therefore eviscerates any need for reforming the alliance and the U.S. policy toward it. Nonetheless, given the far-reaching nature of these eventualities, the realization of one, let alone all, would necessitate a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Europe.

Adding immediacy to this review of U.S. policy is that NATO's strategy, as embodied in MC 14/3, flexible response (which has existed since 1967), is now all but overtaken by events and a replacement document has yet to be agreed to by the alliance. The validity of flexible response was compromised in a symbolic sense by President Bush's statement at the London 1990 NATO summit that nuclear weapons would only be used as a last resort.¹¹ Further complicating this already difficult issue, the U.S. nuclear commitment to its NATO allies, extended deterrence, will surely be degraded should a comprehensive U.S. short-range nuclear forces (SNF) treaty with the Soviet Union be reached.¹²

Finally, an unpleasant and unspoken aspect of NATO's *raison d'être*, to truncate Lord Ismay's often quoted phrase, "to keep the Germans down," must also be rethought. Unified Germany will dominate Europe and can be dealt with by two means: cooption with, or balance against.¹³ The difficulty for U.S. policymakers in making this Hobson's choice was mirrored by France and the United Kingdom in their indelicate approaches to the question of German unity throughout the first half of 1990. However, the choice should be obvious and the Bush administration's direction has long been clear.¹⁴ How NATO is to deal with this change has not been fully articulated, which is not surprising because addressing this issue will

surely call into question the alliance's most basic political assumptions.

That the United States needs to reassess the likely utility of NATO as a vehicle for protecting its interests and pursuing its objectives in Europe is inevitable. If it finds that the alliance has lost its relevance as the key European diplomatic and security forum, then other options, such as cultivating enhanced bilateral defense relationships with key European countries, should be explored. The evidence suggests, however, that, at least during the mid-term, NATO's utility is not in doubt, both from the perspective of achieving U.S. diplomatic and security objectives, as well as remaining relevant to Western strategy.¹⁵ The final chapter in the book on the history of the cold war has yet to be written and it is during this period of *Tod und Verklaerung* ("Death and Transfiguration") of the European security structure that the value of the stabilizing effects of NATO are incalculable. Nonetheless, at some point the need for this stabilization will end and a renaissance of a much more fluid political structure in Europe will occur, which historically has been the norm. One hopes that this return to a more dynamic political structure will occur within the confines of Western European economic and political integration, which would vitiate the return of the renationalization of Western European defense policies. At that juncture, the current institutions which have served the Western Alliance so well during the cold war and this present period of metamorphosis must evolve to incorporate new diplomatic and defense arrangements. Obviously, U.S. strategy will need to respond to such changes in the security environment as well as revisit such unpopular issues as the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Europe and the utility of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western and Central Europe.

It will be argued in this study that there will continue, in the foreseeable future, to be a need for a U.S. military presence in Europe.¹⁶ However, the two problematical aspects of this presence will revolve around the issues of extended deterrence to a Europe that wants U.S. nuclear protection, but

increasingly from afar, and maintenance of U.S. and allied forces in Germany that do not result in significant domestic political opposition to their presence. Moreover, to crown this complicated scenario, this new U.S. approach to Europe will need to fit within an altered European institutional framework. This framework will most likely be comprised of a reformed NATO, complemented by a larger role played by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other fora to which the United States may not be a party, such as the EC and the Western European Union (WEU). The facts lead to the conclusion that at least in the mid-term, the alliance's strategy, force deployment challenges, and intra-political difficulties can be met through the continued presence of U.S. Army forces in Europe, *albeit* in smaller numbers, removed from urban German areas and within multinational formations. While it is difficult to presage how the new European balance will look, it is eminently clear that, in this period of transition, the United States will play the *sine qua non* role of the legitimate and accepted balancing power. The U.S. Army, if reformed to meet the new diplomatic and security environment, will be Washington's principal visible agent in accomplishing this important task.

The New Regional Balance.

It will be argued in this section that the character of the changes in Europe have been so pervasive as to make two points clear. First, finding political consensus within the alliance will become progressively more difficult as the Soviet threat continues to diminish. Second, given this difficulty, two policy options become evident: (1) attempt to downgrade NATO's military orientation to one stressing commonality of diplomatic interests; and/or, (2) launch a series of bilateral initiatives with key European states in the security realm. By taking the bilateral option, Washington could place its allies on notice that it does have alternatives if NATO becomes a meaningless politically entity. In so doing, this policy could force Western Europe to breathe new life and political relevance into that organization for fear of alienating the United States; and failing that, the bilateral option, already set in place, could be exploited. These particular issues will be developed

further in later sections, following an assessment of the altered regional security landscape.

At the center of the ongoing European security realignment are two basic circumstances which must be addressed. These are the unification of the Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany and the creation of a new balance of power in Europe whose legitimacy is recognized by all principal players. These two fundamental political developments are, of course, interrelated since the unification of Germany directly affects the emerging balance in Europe. Moreover, it should be stressed that the unification of Germany may have solved one issue, the amalgamation of two dissatisfied sovereign entities, while leaving a broader one yet to be, if ever, peacefully resolved. A review of European history demonstrates that there has yet to be a lasting and effective solution to the issue of German unity. Unlike other European countries, the mere existence of a unified Germany, straddling Central Europe, has traditionally unbalanced regional stability. Its new combined population of 80 million and potential for a gross national product that will eventually dwarf its EC colleagues, in addition to its geographical domination of the center of Europe, will recreate the historical circumstances which have in the past produced envy in, and challenges to, other European great powers. For example, given its geographic location and competitive economy, Germany is well-positioned to exploit financial and business opportunities as they develop in the former planned economies of the East.

This does not imply that a politically unified and economically strong Germany will produce the dismal statecraft of Wilhelmine Germany and of the Nazi years. Rather, even a unified Germany with absolutely no apparent aggressive or predatory ambitions still stirs uneasy memories in the remainder of Europe due to its potential to threaten and challenge existing balances. This uncertainty and *angst* over Germany's future motives in Europe is compounded by, as argued by Josef Joffe, the fact that "...German unification is unfolding at a far greater speed than the architecture for a post-bipolar Europe."¹⁷ As a result, the very fact that the

unification issue has been handled so adeptly by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at a time when the Warsaw Pact was disintegrating, has been unnerving to some. Notwithstanding this, that the world has witnessed the first bloodless German "revolution" in history should offer some reassurance to the European community of nations. Indeed, Bonn's most immediate challenge is to complete the process of unification and achieve the peaceful removal of 600,000 Soviet citizens from the territory of the former Democratic Republic by 1994, as set out in the October 1990 agreement between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.¹⁸

Complicating the construction of a new European balance will be both the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the remaining questions over how the countries of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact will eventually align themselves in Europe. The future security policies and orientations of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have yet to emerge. Despite their almost universal disdain for the Soviet Union and their strong desires to end quickly the presence of Soviet forces in some of their countries, they are faced with almost imponderable security challenges. For instance, while they have publicly eschewed remaining within the Warsaw Pact (with the predictable exception of Bulgaria), given their precarious economic states, how are they to develop and maintain national air defense systems, once the Pact's integrated air defense system is dismantled following the alliance's political disintegration? If they are to succeed in convincing Moscow that its western border is to be secure, surely the Soviets will insist they develop independent air defense capabilities—an extremely expensive proposition for these financially-strapped countries.¹⁹ The adoption of formal neutrality, which was widely espoused immediately following the fall of the *anciens régimes*, lost its initial seductive luster when these countries realized that such a status could eventually complicate accession to EC, as currently seen in Austria's case.²⁰ Given how Great Power ambitions in Eastern Europe in combination with the perennially unstable Balkans historically have led to massive political disruptions and major

conflicts in European affairs, addressing the security concerns of these states and encouraging regional and domestic stability is not an inconsequential task.

One could also expect that, in spite of its ongoing withdrawal of military forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will continue to have more than a passing interest in the development of the new regional balance and the affairs of Europe. Most in Europe recognize that Russia is a European power in its own right and hence has legitimate interests in regional affairs. In addition, if a stabilizing balance is to have any longevity, Moscow's security concerns, as accepted by the Western Alliance, must be ensured by this new system. If this condition is not met, Moscow will have little incentive to maintain the *status quo*, thereby suggesting the likely reinitiation of a posture of confrontation toward the West. Fortunately for the West, Moscow appears to be resigned to "selling" some of its key security interests in Europe, if the financial price is right. Moscow's surrender on the issues of German unification and Bonn's continued membership in NATO indicate an acceptance of the West's predominant position in Europe's security, as long as Western, especially German, foreign assistance continues to flow eastward.²¹ From all appearances, Moscow's trump cards in its dealing with the West appear to be maintaining a strong and almost unbending position in arms control negotiations and continuing to press for the establishment of a collective security regime for Europe, centered around the institutionalization of the CSCE process. From the Soviet perspective, the establishment of a CSCE regime in Europe could have the ultimate effect of dissolving the two alliances, ameliorating Moscow's diplomatic position and increasing the extent of its influence in the conduct of European affairs.²² Support for this interpretation of Soviet diplomatic motives is found in Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's June 1990 letters to NATO member states urging them to abandon their mutual defense obligations which require them to come to the aid of any allied partner that is attacked.²³ In view of the Soviet Union's relatively weak political position in Europe following the dissolution of its Eastern European empire, Moscow has

nothing to lose and much to gain by seeking to eviscerate NATO and championing a powerful CSCE.

Lastly, the unification of the two Germanies has had a negative, but as yet transitory, effect on NATO itself. That the Federal Republic's European allies were both surprised, if not stupefied, by the political collapse of the Democratic Republic and Bonn's swiftness to unify, is without question. However, the residual political effects of these actions have not been too severe. Britain, France, Italy, and the smaller Western European countries have gradually come around to accepting the inevitability of a unified Germany and the likelihood of its future domination of Western European institutions. Despite the various degrees of West European unquietness over a unified Germany, the public acceptance of unification by Bonn's allies has been relatively quick and easily obtained. Irrespective of any residual fear of an aggressive Germany, it is interesting to note that Bonn's allies in 1990 engaged in extensive, if not competitive, announcements of significant reductions in their respective defense expenditures.²⁴ If there is indeed a fear of a unified Germany in the West, this would tend to indicate that it apparently is in the area of economic competition, not military adventurism.

Nonetheless, the unification of Germany, the apparent retreat of the Soviets back to Mother Russia and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a military threat to the West have combined to place NATO in an awkward situation. With very few exceptions, alliances find it exceedingly difficult to maintain solidarity, let alone continue their existence, in a threat-barren or benign environment. Fortunately for the alliance, to date, either due to the residual Soviet threat, or the "soft" nature of the newly independent non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, alliance solidarity has been maintained to a surprisingly high degree. To be sure, the continuation of NATO's existing military structure has the wonderful advantage from the perspective of Bonn's European neighbors of tying the *Bundeswehr* firmly to the Western Alliance and obviating the creation of a more independent German national command capability above corps level and the formulation of national war

plans.²⁵ The alliance's principal justification for existence, deterring a Soviet military threat to its members, will continue for some time, and perhaps indefinitely. While the Soviet threat to Europe in the form of a massive assault toward the channel ports with the employment of operational maneuver groups has appreciably receded, it is widely acknowledged that Moscow still retains the largest military force in Europe.²⁶ The Soviet military, for instance, continues to modernize its strategic forces,²⁷ and since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, its conventional arms production in tanks and artillery exceeds that which currently exists in the combined inventories of the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Britain.²⁸ Moreover, according to Christopher Donnelly, the Soviet military may be developing a new capability that will allow the Red Army to conduct rapid strikes into Europe to achieve *limited* objectives.²⁹

While European defense officials have not lost sight of the residual Soviet threat to Western Europe, their political counterparts, as in the United States, see things differently. Politicians, under pressure to produce a peace dividend, are less susceptible to wanting to hear of the residual Soviet threat than they are of knowing how much the Soviet threat to Europe has decreased, which will allow them to reduce defense expenditures accordingly. The significance of this observation is not that NATO suffers in the short term from a lack of purpose. Rather its priority in national domestic political debates is decreasing, which could militate against commanding needed attention at a time when reform and reorientation of the alliance are needed. Indeed, the challenges to the United States in providing effective leadership to the alliance should not be depreciated. As the primary threat to the alliance diminishes, post war security structures are rapidly evolving and the alliance has acquired the added responsibility of providing for the defense of the former Democratic Republic of Germany (with the proviso of not being able to station troops in the new *laender* of the Federal Republic which has also has been declared denuclearized by Chancellor Kohl),³⁰ just when defense budgets in the West are being decreased. Providing for the security of the former Democratic Republic could

present considerable defense planning problems since some senior officials in Bonn have emphatically stated that this territory will not constitute a special security zone.³¹

Probably the best analogy one can draw regarding the current situation in Europe in historical perspective is that U.S. diplomacy and strategy in Europe must now be formulated in an environment best akin to that of a victor within a coalition at a peace conference. During a war, or period of severe international adversity, it is relatively easy to suppress national political objectives for the benefit of the common good. However, now that the common threat has diminished appreciably, divergent national interests within NATO are coming to the fore. While this is a normal characteristic of international relations and is to be expected, it does not make U.S. policy formulation any easier. No better example of this new complicating factor can be found than in the case of divergent allied approaches to the CFE I negotiations in Vienna. From the general perspective of the Western Alliance, the CFE accord is welcome since it reduces significantly the Soviet military threat to Central and Western Europe, institutionalizes transparency in military activities in Europe, and encourages the growth of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).³² The envisaged net result of a CFE agreement from the West's perspective will be to diminish Soviet offensive capabilities and increase the warning time of an impending Soviet attack.

As can be expected in any negotiations with the Soviet Union, the process of discussions were slow and painstaking, interspersed with unprecedented breakthroughs. The Alliance maintained a hard line throughout these negotiations in order to gain the best possible agreement. A problematical element that became increasingly evident over the course of the talks was Bonn's reported desire to obtain a CFE accord quickly prior to the 1990 all-German elections, which complicated the West's negotiating position.³³ The lesson to be drawn from this aspect of allied coordination in arms control is that this was another important signal of Bonn's growing independent foreign policy, as recently seen at the July 1990 German-Soviet

summit at Stavropol.³⁴ To put this trend into wider perspective, until 1987, following the Reykjavik summit, Bonn's post war foreign policy almost uniformly adhered to an "Atlanticist" orientation, even if, at times, it was at the expense of national objectives.³⁵ The Federal Republic was severely shaken by President Reagan's serious consideration of President Gorbachev's proposal to ban intercontinental ballistic missiles. As the front line allied member in Europe, such a potential degradation of the nuclear umbrella, without any prior consultation, was assessed by Bonn as bordering on the height of irresponsibility. As a result, Bonn's defense orientation has also reflected this growing independence. According to news accounts, two NATO wargames and tactical evaluations were disrupted in 1989 and 1990 when *Bundeswehr* participants reportedly walked out in protest over the issue of scenarios using nuclear weapons in Central Europe.³⁶

What this all means to the United States is twofold. First, as the principal Western power in Europe, the Federal Republic has begun to exercise a new element of independence in its external policy, heretofore not seen in the alliance. This independence can be expected to grow as Germany assumes the character of a unified, fully sovereign state that is a regional and global power in its own right. This implies that the future U.S. relationship with Bonn will mature and grow in complexity as Germany becomes the dominant power in Europe. It will become the exception, as opposed to the norm, that Bonn will sublimate its own national interests for the interests of the Western Alliance and the United States. In consequence, from the perspective of some on the political left in Germany, the "free ride" Washington has enjoyed in the past in the Federal Republic will become increasingly difficult to justify in Germany, let alone obtain. Second, the example of the Federal Republic is likely to be mirrored by many other allied nations as they express and pursue their diverging national interests at the expense of the common good, as defined by Washington. While this is to be expected as the effects of the cold war dissipate in Europe and fidelity to NATO wanes, it will further complicate the issue as Washington attempts to retain

and restructure the Western coalition in a period when the European balance is realigning itself.

Indeed, with the Soviet Union apparently intent upon leaving Central Europe militarily, the CFE agreement to be possibly complemented by a CFE I Follow-on Accord and a CFE II negotiating round starting in 1992-1993, it is easy to understand how justifying NATO's *raison d'être* will become problematic. It is widely recognized in alliance theory that there are instances where alliances are formed or extended in their longevity in a threat-barren environment within the context of what Morgenthau terms, "ideological solidarity."³⁷ Yet, it would be a brave official or analyst who would attempt to base the security of the United States on the theoretical possibility that NATO will continue to exist and protect U.S. vital interests in Europe after the departure of the Soviet Army from Central and Eastern Europe.³⁸

What all these political perturbations mean in the final analysis is that the regional balance in Europe, as it existed from 1949 to 1990, has changed, and perhaps irreparably so. Admittedly, NATO is, and will continue to be for some time, a pillar of stability during the current period of uncertainty in Europe, if for no other reason than that it is the sole institution within which the United States can play an effective role in European affairs. In view of NATO's continued "relevance," it is easy to see how complacency would reign over U.S. policy toward Europe. This would be a fundamental mistake. Given the changes underway in Europe, the roles and missions for U.S. forces in that theater must adapt. Just as some long-standing missions become irrelevant by contemporary standards, new opportunities will offer themselves to U.S. officials. What will be crucial for U.S. officials and the U.S. Army leadership is to understand the new forces at work in European diplomacy and determine how the Army must restructure and reorient itself in order to remain a key element in U.S. strategy in that region.

Arms Control.

It is appropriate to begin an analysis of the particular issues that will affect future security conditions in Europe by assessing the influence arms control negotiations and subsequent arms limitation regimes will play. It is not proposed to deal extensively in this study with each and every arms control negotiation which could affect the U.S. diplomatic and security position in Europe. Given the fast-breaking nature of these negotiations and the already extant body of information on, 1) the CFE talks and agreement;³⁹ 2) the forthcoming Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) negotiations;⁴⁰ 3) the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START);⁴¹ and 4) the ever elusive naval arms control issue,⁴² it makes little sense to repeat here what has already been well publicized and analyzed *ad infinitum*. Rather, the purpose of this section is to assess what effects the broad implications of these negotiations, and possible accords, will have for U.S. interests in Europe in general, and U.S. Army organizations and missions in particular.

In a general sense, it should be recognized that President Gorbachev's adept diplomatic offensive in Western Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have had the combined effect of bringing arms control issues to the fore in the European security debate. A CFE I accord and CFE I Follow-on agreement, followed by SNF negotiations as proposed by President Bush, will assuredly have a fundamental effect on both NATO strategy and allied conventional and U.S. nuclear forces. Indeed, it is not going too far to state that both strategy and force levels will be severely confined in the future by these agreements and subsequent verification regimes. One example of the likely limitations to be imposed on future U.S. military peacetime operations in Europe is the restriction, whether through CFE or a CSBM arrangement,⁴³ of large scale field exercises. When combined with the growing environmental sensitivities of the Federal Republic in particular, these exercises will surely be severely constrained in that country in the future, just as low altitude flying has already been restricted.⁴⁴ While one could posit that other European NATO countries or other states in

the general region might acquiesce to the use of their exercise and maneuver areas by allied forces, one should recall that intrusive verification as proposed in the CFE negotiations will remain in effect, as well as the presence of Soviet observer teams which could be increased through a CSBM agreement.⁴⁵ While this is not necessarily a negative consideration *per se* (since verification regimes and exercise observation arrangements are based on reciprocity), when combined with other limitations, it could make holding key exercises by the U.S. Army in Europe generally more complicated in the future. In short, whether the U.S. Army and Air Force like it or not, domestic political pressure in the Federal Republic alone will result in the lowering of these services' readiness levels.

Since the Army's exercise "op tempo" in Germany will not be the same in the future, as it has been in the past, alternative sites need to be explored. From the perspective of future training requirements, the U.S. Army should seriously consider the possibility of conducting more of its major field exercises in North America, which is unaffected by the CFE I treaty and could conceivably be untouched in a CFE II round of negotiations. While admittedly not a new idea, U.S. allies should be invited to send maneuver units to U.S. Army training and exercise facilities on a rotational basis, to include the heretofore sacrosanct National Training Center at Fort Irwin. Given the altered regional security environment and growing environmental sensitivities, this idea may find greater acceptance in Europe. Other existing facilities which could be expanded for this mission are Fort Bliss and Pinon Canyon.

While admittedly a sensitive issue and not without financial cost to our allies, extremely compelling rationales support this proposal. First, as mentioned above, intrusive arms control regimes may severely restrict large-scale exercises in Europe in the future, both for the United States and our allies. Under the current definitions of the CFE negotiations, North America is, of course, excluded from the treaty area: the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).⁴⁶ Second, should the U.S. Army shrink in size over the coming years, it will become increasingly difficult to

justify the retention of the exercise and maneuver facilities the U.S. Army has painstakingly built over the years. The utilization by U.S. allies of American exercise facilities would be one way of providing a form of security assistance at little direct cost to the U.S. Army. Third, as Europeans, particularly the Germans, become more sensitive to environmental concerns, one can expect that their respective military establishments will also come under strong pressure to decrease existing exercise tempos. The state-of-the-art and isolated facilities the U.S. Army currently operates in North America are an excellent choice for our allies' future use, as opposed to developing, for example, extensive new facilities in the greater Mediterranean region. Fourth, as will be discussed at greater length below concerning future NATO strategy, the invitation to our allies to use U.S. Army training sites will contribute greatly to maintaining the high degree of interoperability the alliance members' defense forces have worked so hard to develop over the years. Fifth, while perhaps invidious in intent, allied use of U.S. military training facilities places Washington in the position of influencing in a passive way the type of threat against which they will train in an era of ambiguous security perceptions. Sixth, an Alliance exercise policy that places greater emphasis on the use of U.S. and Canadian facilities would be in strong agreement with the objective of reducing the singularization of the Federal Republic. Finally, it would also encourage "specialization" within the existing framework of the EURO/NATO Training Group, at a time when, for political and financial reasons, further defense integration is most needed.

Arms control agreements in Europe will also present new challenges to the U.S. military, which, if handled poorly, could have fatal diplomatic consequences. The onus will be on the U.S. armed services and the U.S. Army, in particular, to develop a comprehensive training program for its personnel stationed in Europe consistent with the exact provisions of arms control agreements and their associated verification regimes. In addition to the justifiable security-related sensitivities with which defense officials will have to be concerned when Soviet verification teams conduct intrusive

visits of U.S. facilities, there are potentially major political ramifications if U.S. military personnel are not knowledgeable of the stated and subtle provisions of arms control accords and their verification addenda. One could imagine the potential political backlash in the Federal Republic of a U.S. military official refusing a Soviet verification team's request for an on-site inspection of a U.S. facility in Germany as stipulated under the terms of a CFE accord. While arguably an unlikely scenario, the fact remains that the vast extent of territory and facilities likely to be subject to the CFE I accord alone (the ATTU region), not to mention what CSBM arrangements might add over time, leads to the conclusion that a small cadre of expert field grade officers will simply not be sufficient to the task. After all, these experts also have the heavy responsibility for conducting on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, which will obviously limit the amount of time and resources they can direct to *all* of their missions. An extensive education program will be required if U.S. national interests are to be protected. Arms control provisions governing U.S. military activity in Europe will have to be comprehensively understood by serving junior, field grade and general officers. Given the extant experience resident at the U.S. Army War College, consideration should be given to establishing an arms agreement and verification education program there for use throughout the Army (e.g., Command and General Staff College and Officer Basic and Advance Courses).

The U.S. Army should also prepare itself in the arms control area for an important likely development in the mid-term. There is good reason to believe that the difficult process of achieving the CFE Treaty convinced many in Europe that future conventional arms control arrangements simply will not be worth the further effort. All one needs to do is review the CFE mandate to conclude that the relatively simple issues involved in this negotiation pale in comparison to the very difficult issues likely to be dealt with in CFE II, e.g., naval arms control. Indeed, one could argue that CFE I has been relatively simple to bring to conclusion since issues upon which consensus was not likely to be found have been put off for consideration in the CFE I Follow-on and CFE II negotiating rounds.

In addition to the difficulty of simply reaching a meaningful future agreement concerning conventional arms control, the point of diminishing returns in a military sense will be a problem for some countries in Europe. For instance, for the smaller Western European countries, the CFE treaty may place many at the margin of maintaining true national military capabilities. The SACEUR, General John Galvin, estimates that a reduction of only 15 percent in the order of battle of some of the smaller allies' armies would result in their inability to maintain national army corps structures.⁴⁷ This will make further arms control reductions contingent upon fundamental political decisions regarding basic military capabilities and whether to "specialize" militarily within the alliance, as recently advocated by Senator Sam Nunn. As envisaged by Nunn, "Each allied country should play the instrument it plays best rather than trying to stage an entire symphony orchestra in each country."⁴⁸ While "specialization" within NATO has many financial attractions in terms of realizing economies of scale, nations traditionally have loathed to surrender such fundamental vestiges of state sovereignty, i.e., the existence, if indeed only illusory, of a military force possessing all basic combat and support capabilities. In consequence, the realization of a formal regime of specialization in military capabilities within NATO is unlikely, although in terms of exercises, there is a possibility for greater success. Lastly, the outlook for further conventional arms control agreements becomes problematic when combined with the financial costs which will be incurred to monitor Soviet compliance with a CFE agreement (which is a national, as opposed to alliance, responsibility).

A complement, and possibly a supplement, to future conventional force reductions in Europe could take the form of CSBMs. Sometimes called "arms control junk food,"⁴⁹ CSBMs have become an increasingly popular medium by which bloc tensions can be mitigated.⁵⁰ The agreements are generally easier to achieve, less costly to implement, and, in the final analysis, produce the ultimate desired effect: improved stability in Europe. The cost factor alone, in an era when most powers in Europe are experiencing reduced defense expenditures, should be reason enough for the United States

to champion these arrangements. Negotiated either bilaterally, or through the CSCE process, CSBMs (e.g., the 1990 Vienna conference on East-West military doctrine, hosted by the *Institut fuer Militaerische Sicherheitspolitik*)⁵¹ represent a midpoint between detente and military preparedness, and should be vigorously supported by the U.S. Army.

This analysis does not imply that there is not a key defense role for the U.S. Army to fulfill in Western and Central Europe in a future where arms control accords and CSBMs will play an important part in regional affairs. Regarding missions, while CFE and SNF accords will limit the number of conventional forces and likely eliminate the U.S. Army's nuclear forces in Europe respectively, the Army will perforce become a more important link in Washington's nuclear guarantee to Europe. Without the presence of U.S. Army forces in Europe, it will be difficult to convey Washington's willingness to employ nuclear forces for the defense of Europe. The U.S. Army is also well suited for conducting the important mission of intelligence collection and assessment of Soviet military activities. In view of the anticipated reduced readiness levels of standing NATO forces on the Central Front,⁵² knowledge of Soviet forces' movements and capabilities will be absolutely crucial to the maintenance of stability. As the sole service with a specialized body of Foreign Area Officers knowledgeable of regional security and political affairs and having foreign language proficiency, the U.S. Army has the opportunity to take the lead in providing specially trained personnel, expertise and intelligence capabilities to track and monitor Soviet compliance with arms control accords.

Thus, although arms control in the European theater presents the United States with not inconsequential challenges, it also presents opportunities and benefits. The codification of transparency of Soviet military activities and other CSBMs, heretofore not realized by the alliance, is surely worth the costs it will impose on allied defense activities in Europe. The U.S. Army is well situated to profit from these arms limitation and reduction regimes, as it develops further

capabilities and expertise which will be desperately required in the new security landscape in Europe.

Institutional Metamorphosis.

As could be expected from the massive political realignment ongoing in the European theater, the security and political institutions which developed as a result of, and were produced during, the cold war have come under close scrutiny for possible dissolution or reform. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is but a phantom, with its key European members publicly expressing their intention to leave that alliance.⁵³ Neither has NATO been spared calls for it to initiate fundamental "reform" and to become more a political, as opposed to a military, alliance. At the same time, in view of the evolution toward the possible dissolution of the two blocs in Europe, a pan-European collective security body, in the form of the CSCE, has been proposed by some, including President Gorbachev, as being the appropriate means of achieving the "Common European Home."⁵⁴ The subtle difference in nomenclature should be noted. The North Atlantic Alliance, since its inception, has been concerned with the collective *defense* of its members with clear obligations of reciprocity on the part of the partners as established by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. The proposed CSCE arrangement, on the other hand, is a collective *security regime* and would be a wider arrangement (whose membership would possess disparate security concerns) of 35 members where security matters would be subject to achieving consensus among the entire collective. Moreover, it needs to be recalled that collective security is based upon the premise of a commonality of interests, since it cannot create them.

Although evolution in the institutional European security framework is generally assessed as being in U.S. interests, Washington, nevertheless, needs to be very attentive to any proposed alterations to current organizations. These could easily result in the U.S. position being diminished and its interests challenged in large part due to it not being a European power. This does not imply that there is a consensus developing in Europe that Washington no longer plays an

essential role in regional security. Rather, other alliance members could develop positions which would deprecate U.S. interests while enhancing their own. There is, naturally, nothing new in this concern. French policy, for instance, has long attempted to diminish America's diplomatic influence in Europe in order to enhance its own prestige and position.⁵⁵ What the United States needs to be concerned with is that alterations to European security institutions are not made at the expense of its interests or position, nor at the cost of presenting the Soviet Union with veto powers over U.S. actions in Western Europe. In this respect, the CSCE process and exclusionary Western European integration efforts are not without their own serious potential problems for the United States.

CSCE. While the proposal to institutionalize the CSCE process to allow it to take on a greater role in regional security affairs has been met with some justifiable skepticism, CSCE should not be totally rejected out of hand. It will be recalled that the mandate establishing the basis for the CFE negotiations was effected within the context of CSCE and has served Western interests well.⁵⁶ Moreover, it would appear to be inevitable that as the Warsaw Pact continues to atrophy, CSCE will become the only forum within which these Central and Eastern European states can participate in collective discussions on regional security issues. After all, one cannot expect the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact to take part in regional security matters as members of a security and diplomatic bloc most of whom now eschew.⁵⁷ There is a clear need for the security concerns of these states to be discussed in an open forum, if Europe is to avoid the renationalization of defense policies in this potentially unstable region. Thus, if the West is to engage meaningfully in a security dialogue with reforming Central and Eastern European countries, the CSCE process must evolve into more than a congenial debating society discussing esoteric issues.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the range of activities and scope of CSCE will inevitably expand over time. As a result of the Charter of Paris signed in November 1990, CSCE will gain an institutional structure that it has heretofore

lacked, and its sponsorship of arms control initiatives and CSBM discussions will increase in breadth and import. In consequence, just as arms control and CSBM initiatives become increasingly important in the European security debate, CSCE could well provide the venue for these diplomatic negotiations. While the "ultimate" structure of CSCE as envisaged by some, such as German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher,⁵⁸ is idealistic at best and unachievable at worst, CSCE has the potential for furthering U.S. and Western security interests. For instance, as a new security architecture is created for the Old Continent, CSCE does have the obvious potential for providing a forum in which all states with vital interests in Europe can have their concerns addressed. This institution could provide the basis by which the Soviet Union is brought into the European security debate thereby giving Moscow a stake in maintaining, instead of disrupting, the *status quo*. Not to be deprecated, within CSCE the United States and Canada are recognized as countries having legitimate and vital interests in Europe and deserving a voice in the conduct of regional affairs.

At the same time, the CSCE process is not without severe limitations and will only work to achieve U.S. and Western interests if certain conditions are fulfilled. On the negative side, advocates⁵⁹ of the CSCE process often fail to mention in their adulation supporting it that its membership includes not only NATO and Warsaw Pact participants, but 12 European neutrals as well.⁶⁰ The creation of a pan-European security order would have to be acceptable not only to the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, but also to countries like Switzerland and Sweden which have followed policies of armed neutrality for centuries. One would be naive to assume that the Swiss, for whom armed neutrality has worked quite nicely in deterring foreign invasion, would happily abandon centuries of tradition in order to sign up for a pan-European collective security arrangement.

Thus, the judicious conclusion concerning the CSCE process is for the Western Alliance to participate actively in it only if it is complementary, as opposed to being

supplementary, to NATO and the WEU, or whatever metastatic bodies might follow them. This is no insignificant warning since collective security in its most basic sense represents the antithesis of the concept of alliance. A North Atlantic Assembly report echoes this concern by arguing, ". . . although the CSCE provides the proper forum for negotiations such as on CSBMs and, in [the] future, conventional arms control, the CSCE as a security instrument cannot replace the Atlantic Alliance."⁶¹ It is simply beyond the pale to contemplate that *any* sovereign country would be willing to abdicate elements of its most basic national security prerogative to a multinational forum where its vital security interests would be subject to veto by 34 other countries. Furthermore, as the same North Atlantic Assembly report reflects on the issue of the Common European Home, ". . .the Alliance countries cannot be expected to move into a new 'home' without a reliable insurance policy."⁶² Continued uncertainty regarding the future actions and motives of the Soviet Union, the extreme economic differences between NATO countries and the former members of the Eastern bloc, and the explosive nature of the ethnic minorities issue endemic in Central and Eastern Europe, all point to the need for the continuation of Western security institutions. In the words of Peter Cortsier, "in view of all of the changes transpiring in Europe, the general consensus in the West is...the West is better off with NATO than without it."⁶³

NATO. There is little doubt then that in the short- to mid-term, NATO members will continue to see it as providing a valuable organization through which their collective defense interests are protected. At the same time, sagacious, unemotional reflection is needed, given the decreased importance that organization will likely play in future regional affairs. Undue alarm should not be raised since this process is unavoidable over time. This does not imply that the United States should take the alliance lead in a search for new missions for the organization in an attempt to ensure its survival. New initiatives proposed for NATO have included sponsoring economic development programs for Central and Eastern Europe, and attempting to institutionalize out-of-area operations within the alliance.⁶⁴ Any attempt to alter NATO's

prime function, the collective defense of the alliance area, would be unsuccessful and moreover is not needed.

What Washington will have to be concerned with as the Soviet threat diminishes and as Western European integration continues to produce a more cohesive body of states is that NATO does not become irrelevant in regional political or defense matters. While the United States has long argued for and supported the concept of European political and security integration,⁶⁵ as it becomes a more likely eventuality, reflection on its possible effects on U.S.-Western European relations is needed. The forum within which Western European security cooperation is likely to be conducted is the WEU, despite recent calls for the EC to expand its purview to include defense matters.⁶⁶ From the perspective of Washington, the WEU (established by the 1948 Brussels Treaty and altered by 1954 Paris Agreements) has been a rather benign, sleepy organization and hardly a challenge to U.S. interests in Europe. Despite the Brussels Treaty attraction of being a defense alliance without geographic limitations,⁶⁷ until 1984 one of the WEU's principal functions was to monitor West German rearmament and Bonn's compliance with nuclear, biological and chemical nonproliferation accords through its Agency for the Control of Armaments.⁶⁸

The WEU or some other amalgamation of Western European organizations could, however, introduce new competitive forces into the Western Alliance. Historically, the WEU has stressed that its existence and actions were complementary to NATO, and even some keener advocates for a European Pillar have envisaged the WEU acting as a security community within the Atlantic Alliance. While the creation of a European defense organization appears still to be problematic in the near term, the WEU could challenge NATO for the lead in the new, important mission of European arms control verification. Not yet widely known is that accession by North American and European states to a CFE treaty will include the national responsibility of verifying compliance. In other words, it is not likely that NATO members will delegate all of their responsibility in this area to the alliance.

Coordination of national verification efforts and sharing of information are, of course, allowed and most likely will be a new mission NATO will wish to fulfill. A 1990 WEU report argued for the creation of a European satellite verification agency within the WEU with the dual mission of monitoring arms control and CSM verification, as well as providing warning of out-of-area threats to Western Europe. In view of the past activities of its Agency for the Control of Armaments, the WEU, the report argued, would be well-suited for the mission of verification.⁶⁹

Given the importance of coordinating alliance verification efforts and the need to maintain the institutional link to Western Europe as provided by NATO over at least the mid-term, the creation of a European verification agency could work against U.S. interests in Europe. From Washington's perspective, NATO and not the WEU would be the logical organization to coordinate national verification efforts and it is problematic whether there is a need for two Western international agencies to do the job. This particular issue demonstrates that some aspects of Western European integration could work to diminish NATO's value to its European and North American members, and needs to be carefully monitored.

Irrespective of the eventual success of creating a stronger European Pillar, that NATO's relative import in European affairs will diminish does not mean that it will necessarily become irrelevant to regional security or to U.S. regional interests. As the language in which the European security debate is communicated becomes progressively more diplomatic with larger numbers of independent actors, as opposed to being military and confined to two blocs, a collective defense alliance like NATO is bound to decrease in import. NATO's absolute value, however, will continue to be to provide an "insurance policy" against uncertainty;⁷⁰ and what will increasingly become important is maintaining the capability of the alliance members' armed forces to operate together, i.e., interoperability. Assuming these activities continue unaffected, NATO's relevance from the U.S. perspective will remain undiminished.

The continued existence of NATO also is attractive to the Federal Republic's neighbors. Since its creation in 1955, the *Bundeswehr* has been oriented to operate within the Western Alliance, as opposed to being "an instrument for independent military power projection." Consequently, the *Bundeswehr* is closely integrated into NATO's military structures to a degree not matched by any other Alliance member—an extent that is further evident in the *Bundeswehr*'s lack of national war plans. While it may not have the same meaning in the United States, the fact that the Federal Republic does not have a highly visible *Generalstab* and national war plans is not lost upon Germany's allies and friends. The proposition that a unified German military will remain tightly entwined within the NATO wartime integrated military command structure is surely reassuring to a nervous Europe and Soviet Union, and furthers their interest in the alliance's continuation. It is, however, problematic how much longer the Federal Republic will continue to acquiesce to this compromise of its national prerogative, and Bonn's creation of a new command relationship over the now defunct *Nationale Volksarmee* and air defense arrangements by the *Luftwaffe* for the airspace of the former Democratic Republic merits scrutiny.⁷¹ In the future Bonn's European allies may have to consider surrendering a greater degree of their own national military prerogative to NATO, or another European defense organization,⁷² if that is the price to be paid to avoid "singularizing" the Federal Republic. What this could mean for the Federal Republic's allies is that, at some point in the future, they will not be able to avoid the fact that Germany will no longer tolerate this state of affairs and will have the choice of either supporting defense integration with deeds, or quite possibly destroying German consensus on Allied forces stationed in Germany and the alliance itself. This issue is mentioned at this stage merely to point out a potential challenge to the alliance, and will be dealt with at length below.

In view of the changed security environment and problematic future of NATO past the mid-term, the United States should progressively initiate selective bilateral security arrangements with some of its NATO allies. The primary reason for this is that while NATO will remain relevant to

European security issues through the mid-term, the development of select bilateral relationships will enable Washington to capitalize in the short term, for example, on the growing out-of-area security concerns of some allies. While the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has resulted in a high degree of alliance solidarity to date, it would be injudicious to assume alliance unanimity on all extra-regional security issues.

The spread of weapons of mass destruction and growing domestic political turmoil in countries in North Africa and the Middle East make an effective Western response too important to be left in every instance to the vicissitudes of alliance politics. Countries like France, Italy, Britain, and Spain quietly have been developing over the last decade the capability to deploy rapid reaction, airmobile and/or airportable forces for operations outside of the immediate-European theater. France created the *Force d'Action Rapide* from the *Forces d'Actions Exterieures* in 1983 for the purpose of providing a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations.⁷³ The Italian Army subsequently created the *Forca di Intervento Rapido* in 1985⁷⁴ and in 1988, the Spanish Army tested for the first time its *Fuerza de Accion Rapida*, a formation modeled on the French and Italian examples.⁷⁵ It would make good sense for the United States to approach these countries individually to establish close bilateral relationships with the aim of cooperation where common concerns for responding to out-of-area contingencies exist. This would avoid raising this perennially divisive issue in NATO councils and provide the United States operational alternatives. If for no other reason, the testing of operational procedures, doctrines and concepts should be undertaken and exercised periodically in order to assure the existence of an acceptable degree of interoperability between these specialized European and U.S. forces.

Finally, the initiation of bilateral relationships with certain allies could have an added political benefit. Besides surreptitiously developing consensus on certain issues within the alliance, visible bilateral initiatives would also serve notice

to U.S. allies that Washington will pursue its security objectives, notwithstanding its continued membership in NATO. The bilateral "card" could be effective in countering intra-European security initiatives exclusive of NATO. By this, should the WEU's defense initiatives develop to the point where they appear to exclude U.S. interests,⁷⁶ selective bilateral initiatives could balance Washington's extra-regional singularity. While prudence is required in judging what issues should be advanced on a bilateral basis, U.S. planners must recognize that the way business was done for the past 40 years in the Western Alliance is changing, thereby requiring alternative means to meet new security challenges, such as Third World contingencies.

NATO's "Strategy."

That NATO strategy is in transition due to the diminution in the Soviet threat and, as reflected by President Bush's July 1990 statement at the NATO summit, that the use of nuclear weapons by NATO would be only as a last resort, is without question.⁷⁷ Whether the United States appreciates it or not, the NATO strategy of flexible response, as codified by the document MC 14/3, will change both for reasons of perception and substance. As to the former, despite Henry Kissinger's observation that flexible response threatens no country that harbors benign intentions toward NATO,⁷⁸ the fact remains that this particular strategy has the liability of being seen by many in Europe, especially on the political left,⁷⁹ as being a nuclear strategy, notwithstanding its provisions for graduated response. At a time when the competition for public approval in Western Europe has become as important a consideration as concerns over the residual Soviet threat, insistence on retaining a document which is seen as having atavistic nuclear connotations is an invitation for conflict in the public and diplomatic arenas. The strategy of flexible response will also be of limited relevance in a Europe where short-range nuclear weapons have been withdrawn, either through an SNF Treaty with the Soviet Union, or as a result of a U.S. unilateral withdrawal due to intense antinuclear sentiments in Western Europe. Parenthetically, the withdrawal of U.S. SNFs from Europe automatically will bring into question the even larger

issue of the credibility of Washington's extended nuclear deterrence to its European allies.⁸⁰ By removing the SNF and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) rungs in the escalation ladder (the latter having been removed by the 1987 INF Treaty), one could argue that America's nuclear guarantee to Western Europe will be eviscerated, leaving in theater only sea-launched missiles and dual capable aircraft.⁸¹ It should not be surprising, therefore, that Europeans by and large want the U.S. Army to remain in Europe to lend credibility to the U.S. commitment to deter aggression given the substantial reductions of in-theater U.S. nuclear forces.

While it can be expected that a new NATO "strategy" will eventually be developed and announced publicly with considerable fanfare thus manifesting the alliance's *Verklaerung* (e.g., MC 14/3 *bis*, or MC 14/4), one important aspect needs to be stressed, irrespective of the alliance's ultimate strategic orientation. Both during, and following the current period of strategy reorientation, a prime consideration in NATO strategy and operational doctrine must be to stress retaining alliance members' interoperability. In addition to providing the members' defense forces with a meaningful operational mission during a period of ambiguity in threat perceptions, the maintenance of this quickly perishable capability would enable the NATO countries to continue to operate together in theater, as well as to project force outside of Europe if so required. This seemingly unimportant aspect of Western strategy should not be underestimated. For instance, while much has been made of the WEU's sponsorship of the deployment of members' forces to the Persian Gulf in 1987⁸² and more recently in 1990,⁸³ two simple facts need to be recognized. First, the dispatch of these forces was in actuality a deployment of NATO navies using NATO-developed tactics and doctrines (e.g., Allied Tactical Publications, Allied Communications Publications and General Supplements thereto), solely under the political aegis of the WEU. Second, these deployments could never have been successful without the close operational relationship which has been painstakingly developed between the NATO navies over the past 40 years.

Thus, NATO's new "strategy" must have an important provision to maintain interoperability, both for the sake of encouraging the eventual development of a European defense organization, as well as to enable our allies to take on greater responsibilities in protecting Western interests outside of the immediate European region. In the immediate term as well, an amorphous strategy stressing interoperability could provide some of the smaller members of NATO with a rationale for maintaining an adequate level of defense expenditures and an acceptable degree of operational tempo during a period of austere defense budgets. Moreover, the need to be able to respond to extra-regional contingencies could be embodied in NATO strategy within a more acceptable strategic orientation of placing greater emphasis on the collective defense of NATO's flanks, as recently endorsed by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner.⁸⁴ While Central Europeans have rejoiced in the expected withdrawal of the Soviets from their region, this perception has not been shared by Norway and Turkey, where the Soviet Army still looms large on their borders.⁸⁵ As recently witnessed in Norway over the possible alteration of NATO wartime command arrangements that would effectively disconnect Oslo from "the continent," the alliance has much substantive work to do to convince the allies on the flanks that their security concerns and requirements have not, and will not, be ignored.⁸⁶

There is also ample evidence that supports the view that all European countries have grown anxious in recent years about their southern and southeastern flanks,⁸⁷ and some have undertaken steps to prepare themselves for military operations outside Europe proper, as seen in the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis.⁸⁸ Population growth which far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome East Europeans. At the same time, West European investment and aid is being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists (e.g., the Islamic Fundamentalist victory in June 1990 provincial and local elections in Algeria).⁸⁹ Likewise some North African and Middle

Eastern nationalists have evidenced an increased appetite for long-range weapons of mass destruction. This situation is fraught with risk for Europe as well as for the United States and should be addressed in common. Setting the stage for such cooperation through interoperability exercises and perhaps even bilateral contingency planning with select European allies is now pertinent and could be facilitated through further military integration. German Christian Democratic Party defense expert Otto Hauser recently suggested that threats to Europe, as manifested by the Gulf crisis, warrant the creation of a European intervention force.⁹⁰ A new strategy that emphasizes the development of quick reaction airmobile capabilities, to be followed by heavy forces if required, would meet the needs for operations on the Central Front (as argued by LTG Henning von Ondarza, Chief of Staff of the German Army),⁹¹ as well as on the flanks and outside of Europe proper. The creation of a coordinated alliance airmobile and/or airportable formation would go a long way toward providing a capability to defend the territory of the former Democratic Republic, which would militate against the contention in the domestic German political debate that these new states of the Federal Republic constitute a special security zone. Such a NATO force for European contingencies, under SACEUR's operational control, is outlined in Appendix A.

In conclusion, any attempt to press for a new strategy to replace MC 14/3 based overwhelmingly on a Soviet threat to the Central Front which is not seen as realistic by Europeans during this period of upheaval in threat perceptions could well introduce an unwanted element of dissension into the alliance. If one recalls that it took years of acrimonious debate to achieve consensus in NATO on the flexible response strategy, and the alliance lost France from the military integrated wartime command structure during the process, one is led to the conclusion that it would be best for NATO to balance the political imperative to show the public it has changed to adapt to the altered security environment, with the need to leave considerable flexibility in the future employment of alliance forces. The residual Soviet threat, potential instability in the Balkans, European uncertainty over the nature of a unified

Germany, and threats from the South manifest a continued need for an alliance strategy to meet all these diverse political and operational challenges. Maintaining the ability to operate militarily in concert should be the *sine qua non* of the MC 14/3's replacement document.

Force Structure Options.

Directly related to the issue of alliance strategy is that of force structure and what the U.S.' standing contribution to NATO ought to be. Four fundamental issues become apparent if the Soviet threat continues to decrease and formal arrangements are effected whereby warning time is greatly increased through an arms control regime institutionalizing transparency. First, U.S. force levels can, and justifiably should, decrease in the European theater. Second, in view of changes taking place in Europe, the layer-cake concept of allied force deployments in the Federal Republic becomes all but irrelevant to Western security requirements, at least in its current form.⁹² Third, the relevance of forward deployed allied forces in the Federal Republic is also thrown into question. And fourth, if the current political regime governing allied deployments in the Federal Republic is not changed or reformed, then NATO risks irritating German public opinion and thence producing exactly the opposite effect *in extremis* that the alliance is attempting to achieve. If one accepts the proposition that the key to maintaining stability in Europe is through the development of an equitable and acceptable regional balance and the continued Western orientation of the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany, then the continued peacetime deployment of allied forces in the Federal Republic must be strongly influenced by that country's domestic political conditions.

This gives rise to the obvious questions, will allied forces need to be forward deployed in the Federal Republic, if so how many, and how should they be configured? As to the question of whether U.S. and other allied forces will still be permitted to be stationed in Germany, it needs to be understood that there currently is no significant domestic political element in Germany that advocates the complete and immediate

withdrawal of allied forces from the Federal Republic.⁹³ As a non-nuclear great power situated in the potentially volatile region of Central Europe, Bonn understands that a residual U.S. military presence makes sound sense and is in its best interests. A U.S. Army presence in the Federal Republic signifies Washington's resolve to remain committed to European security affairs. It also brings with it U.S. nuclear deterrence which is unconvincing without U.S. ground forces.⁹⁴ Should an SNF accord with the Soviets be achieved and U.S. SNF forces be withdrawn from Europe, then a continued U.S. Army presence in the Federal Republic will greatly increase in importance in terms of making Washington's provision of extending deterrence credible to Bonn and all of Western Europe. As the Federal Republic has publicly declared that it will not develop its own nuclear capability, reliance on the United States for nuclear deterrence will continue. Despite the existence of not inconsequential French and British nuclear forces, they pale in comparison to the Soviet strategic inventory. While a unified European nuclear deterrent may one day be created as an integral part of a Western European defense organization and may be the ultimate solution to Germany's deterrence requirements, most agree that such an eventuality is a long way off.⁹⁵

Notwithstanding Bonn's objective of maintaining allied forces on its territory, this German objective contains a number of qualifications that require close scrutiny. Domestic opposition to the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic has been strongly muted by the Bush administration's consistent and unequivocal support for German unification, particularly early on when French and British attitudes were opposed to "ein Deutschland."⁹⁶ An enormous reservoir of public good will has been created in the Federal Republic by the actions of the U.S. administration; however, it will not last forever.⁹⁷ While it is acknowledged by Germans that a continued U.S. presence will assuage their European neighbors, east and west, of Bonn's continued benign intentions, it would be extremely imprudent to assume that the *status quo* has been unaffected. Fundamentally, as the unquestioned dominant state in non-Russian Europe, the

proposition that German officials and their political constituents will continue to accept passively the pretense of being an "occupied" country is preposterous. As Eckhard Luebkemeier politely reminds us, one of the principal "hidden missions" of NATO has been to ensure Europe of Germany's continued benign intentions.⁹⁸ As long as allied formations in the Federal Republic continue unchanged in their cold war stationing modes, the alliance and its military structure will take on very negative and atavistic cold war connotations in that country. In short, an "incomplete" superpower, as the enlarged Federal Republic will surely become, will not accept the continuation of present allied force deployments. Since it has been established that allied forces are still required as defined by Bonn (the number 150,000 has recently been suggested by Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg),⁹⁹ the question comes down to how they are to be deployed. Given the overriding importance of domestic German political considerations, the restructuring of NATO's forces in the Federal Republic, within the configuration of multinational corps, would appear to provide the best means of achieving this goal. If this proposition is accepted, then the U.S. Army in Germany requires substantial change.

Prior to the deployment of units to Operation Desert Shield, the U.S. Seventh Army was made up of 17 armor-heavy brigades and regiments, concentrated entirely in the Federal Republic. As configured, it is no longer affordable and is out of step with the emerging European politico-military environment. The U.S. Army is concentrated overwhelmingly in Germany where the greatest threat has been since 1948. That threat is changing and the Army must adapt or become irrelevant, both for European and U.S. security interests. In consequence, it is prudent to expand the existing concept of allied multinational formations to encompass standing corps formations. The current trend in Europe is toward the integration of defense efforts, which necessitates a positive U.S. attitude toward this concept.

Multinational formations are not new to alliance members and already exist in the form of the Allied Command Europe

(ACE) Mobile Force (Air and Land), the Franco-German Brigade in Boeblingen¹⁰⁰ and the proposed multinational airmobile division for Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).¹⁰¹ The U.S. Army has long participated in both formal and informal integrated formations. For instance, while not widely recognized, the U.S. Army's VII Corps has had a close operational relationship for many years with the German Army's 12th *Panzer* Division, which at times includes the latter exercising operational control over brigades of the former. Now is an auspicious time for the United States to exert leadership to effect a more closely integrated multinational command structure in the Federal Republic, to include the integration of most combat support and select service support functions. This would allow corps to become fully integrated in peace, as well as in war. The concept would directly benefit U.S. security interests and should be pursued vigorously by the U.S. Army leadership. Its potential for furthering U.S. security interests in Europe should be abundantly clear and the concept would help to clarify the necessary role and size of the Army in the near term in relation to residual missions in Europe and adjacent areas. Appendix A contains a proposed structure for Central Europe.

The benefits to be gained by the United States from raising such formations are numerous. They would reduce the cost of U.S. forward deployments in Europe by spreading tactical support structure requirements among our allies. Although supply, maintenance, personnel, food service, finance, and postal services must remain national responsibilities carried out by national units, there is no reason that transportation, chemical decontamination, laundry and bath, tactical intelligence, communications, water supply, bridging, and construction engineer functions cannot be fully integrated at corps level. Similarly, air space management, fire support coordination, and barrier operations are roles requiring close cooperation at corps level, which can best be planned by staffs which are fully integrated and carried out by allies operating under common operational control. The obvious political benefit of pressing for the integration of allied corps in the Federal Republic is that they would be a less likely target in

that country's domestic political debate: a consideration which should be of prime import to the U.S. Army.¹⁰²

In order to achieve these ambitious military objectives, three basic guiding principles are required in establishing these formations. Firstly, in order to simplify C³ and combat service support between the division and corps level, no more than two countries would form a single multinational corps (with the exception of functional formations). Secondly, within each corps, there should be a distribution of certain functional responsibilities between corps headquarters and divisions. Thus, one nation would be charged with providing, for example, communications between corps and division headquarters to ensure compatibility and continuity. Thirdly, while certain support functions normally assigned to corps headquarters would remain national responsibilities (e.g., supply), these formations would, nevertheless, still report to the corps commander. This would ensure that the corps commander would have a full and accurate appreciation of the state of these essential services in each of his divisions.

The formation of these units could also provide the needed impetus for creating greater allied consensus for, and participation in, operations on the Southern Flank. The United States and the Western Alliance could also take advantage of some of our European allies' common interest in force projection through the generation of a larger, in place, SACEUR strategic reserve, with theater-wide and beyond contingency orientations. The development of this formation would be consistent with the proposed NATO strategy precepts outlined above. Such a force must be created to address the uncertainties on Europe's geopolitical horizon and to adapt to the exceptional distances over which forces must be deployed to reach likely areas of crisis. By the mid-1990s, the threat to Germany, Norway, and Turkey could well be far from the centers of NATO's main strength. To reach those areas with sufficient strength to deter, or to stop, an attack while heavier forces are brought in, requires a relatively light and highly mobile corps-size reaction force.¹⁰³ There is similarly a real need to reassure the allies on the flanks that their security

interests are not being ignored at a time when the threat to the Central Front has diminished. Italy (not to mention NATO's Iberian and Levantine allies) is anxious that "peace" in Central Europe could work to decouple its security concerns from its northern neighbors.¹⁰⁴ The creation of an allied strategic reserve for theater-wide utilization would reassure the allies on the flanks, as well as give the alliance a needed military capability. Finally, multinational formations would manifest the apotheosis of the strategy of stressing interoperability within NATO. While only encouraging (as opposed to necessitating) the standardization of weapon systems, the integration of forces at this level would necessitate the maintenance of interoperability, which should be a key objective in the alliance, at present and in the future.

A further advantage of multinational corps, and a not inconsequential one in these days of budgetary constriction, would be the opportunity to streamline NATO's command structure. It is certain that there will be several fewer national corps and substantially fewer in-place divisions in ACE in the coming years through the terms of the CFE accord and/or the effects of diminished financial resources. What must be an absolute guiding principle for future U.S. military force structure development in Europe is to ensure that within the numerical limits imposed by a CFE accord, as large a percentage of deployed forces as possible should be combat-related, as opposed to layered in needless headquarters. Under the possible terms of a CFE Follow-on agreement where U.S. force levels in theater assuredly will have a numerical ceiling, it makes very little sense to maintain less useful command headquarters at the expense of combat forces. In such a sparse environment there is little reason to keep two Army Groups arrayed between corps and ACE, thereby vitiating the continued need of U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Headquarters. The elimination of that command echelon would streamline C³ and reduce outlays for manpower and communications infrastructure. It would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to integrate itself further into the NATO military structure, thereby diminishing the image of a singularized Germany. Essential logistical and other national support

functions are the legitimate role of the 21st Theater Army Support Command, making U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Headquarters a dubious "requirement."

A more prudent use of existing resources would be to transform USAREUR Headquarters into a multinational corps, combining the assets of USAREUR and NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), collocated at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg. The four-star USAREUR commander would remain the Army component commander for U.S European Command and his three-star deputy would become the multinational corps commander with a genuine wartime operational mission. That would allow the elimination of U.S. Corps headquarters at both Frankfurt and Stuttgart, removing a controversial U.S. presence from crowded German metropolitan areas. The impact would be to place two U.S. and two German divisions in a collective command structure exercising the same functions in peace as in war. Such a step would be similar to the integration of British and German forces in northern Germany.

In essence, these considerations suggest that a multinational corps structure within NATO would support U.S. and European security needs. This proposed structure must flow from the missions ACE will face as Europe's political geography undergoes a series of changes expected in the years ahead. By applying creativity, there is indeed a method to generate a more appropriate force structure for Europe's emerging security requirements in the post-cold war world. The obvious implication for U.S. defense officials is that future planning for the defense of Western and Central Europe will have to take place within a totally new and politically-sensitive environment. U.S. commanders will face new and different management, doctrinal and possibly even operational "challenges" in a multinational corps environment, especially within corps level combat support and combat service support elements. However, senior Army leaders could very well be left with little choice but to accept these nettlesome difficulties, particularly if this is the only manner by which the alliance allows U.S. forces to remain forward deployed in Europe. It is

incumbent, therefore, that the senior Army leadership initiate the staff process to study the challenges and impediments which will confront Army units should they be directed to form multinational corps with allied armies.

Lastly on the subject of multinational units, the process of participation in these formations could also prove to be essential to U.S. vital interests in Europe in the mid- to long term. It is common knowledge that failing the downfall of Soviet President Gorbachev and the return of the *status quo ante*, the U.S. Army is eventually going to shrink due to arms control arrangements in Europe and domestic budgetary pressures. While the structure of the U.S. Army is presently based on Division Force Equivalents (DFE), the possibility exists that due to technological advances and the ever increasing cost of manpower, specialized, independent brigades could over time become the norm, *vice* DFEs. Hypothetically, it could well be the case that an Army structure based on brigades would be more combat effective in an Army of, say, 500,000.

This specific and probably unpopular point is raised because if the European security landscape continues its evolution toward a less threatening environment, where regional political and economic institutions play an ever increasingly important role, then the prevailing military need, and political rationale for the continuation of even multinational corps formations, could diminish. Clearly, a unified Germany that is rid of the unwelcomed Soviet Western Group of Forces and is the economic and political leader of an integrated Western Europe is unlikely to acquiesce passively to being the only member of NATO that hosts substantial foreign forces on its soil, particularly if the Soviet conventional and theater nuclear threat to Western Europe is eroded by domestic political turmoil and arms control agreements. In such a scenario, U.S. and allied force levels in Germany could again be directed to shrink to brigade-size formations and restationed throughout Europe, thereby spreading the burden of maintaining foreign stationed forces to all alliance members. From this might develop pressures for further military integration whereby multinational divisions (particularly

functional formations, e.g., rapid reaction) could be raised, although this may not be desirable in view of the operational challenges they create. Nonetheless, creation of multinational divisions would be beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, it would be unwise to station scarce NATO multinational corps throughout Europe. National brigades, within NATO divisions, would make better political and, in the end, military sense. Secondly, the further integration of NATO military forces down to this level would both promote the creation of a European defense organization (with active U.S. military participation), as well as discredit the image that Germany continues to be singularized. Finally there is a noticeable trend in Europe toward defense integration and it would be politically wise for the United States to participate.

The proposal to create multinational divisions has recently been suggested by Bundestag deputy Bernd Wilz.¹⁰⁵ German Defense Minister Stoltenberg also has even endorsed the concept of forming additional multinational brigades, to include a German-U.S. formation.¹⁰⁶ Albeit controversial, the implementation of further military integration would achieve important results. While obviously this proposition would not be met with overwhelming adulation in countries like Denmark and Norway, whose laws proscribe the peacetime stationing of foreign forces, they may not have any choice in the larger political scheme of things. If the Federal Republic comes to the conclusion over time that being the sole NATO country with a sizeable foreign force presence is unacceptable, the proposition that all Western allies host foreign forces as a manifestation of alliance solidarity and commitment could be one long-term solution. In this respect, the increased presence of *Bundeswehr* units training and exercising in North America will become a crucial manifestation of the U.S. willingness to share in their burden. The development of multinational corps formations would also provide the essential link between current and long-term force structure requirements in NATO, should multinational divisions become politically expedient.

Conclusions.

It is clear, therefore, that the European security environment has been fundamentally altered and the future mission of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe must change correspondingly. Difficult times loom ahead for both the Western Alliance and the United States in Europe, especially since there is as yet much unfinished business to be completed in such areas as arms control and alliance reform. While perhaps some would like to wish these changes away and hope that Gorbachev's reforms are unsuccessful, a Pandora's Box of political realignment has been opened and its effects are likely to remain. After all, very little likelihood exists that the *status quo ante* could be reestablished given the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the strong moves toward further Western European integration that are a result of German unification, which in themselves would perforce alter the character of the Western Alliance and the U.S. position in it. Europe *has* changed and Washington must alter long-standing policies toward that region if it is to maintain any influence. But, as John Newhouse warns, "Washington must learn to practice diplomacy as it was practiced when America wasn't a preeminent world power."¹⁰⁷

This does not imply that the important security and political role played by the United States in Europe has in any way been depreciated. Rather, it has changed. It is true that U.S. influence has decreased in a relative sense concerning the Federal Republic due to that country's new dominant status in Europe.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, U.S. prestige and influence are still very high and will remain so, if for no other reason than it is the sole country in the world capable of playing the role of the honest broker and has never harbored territorial ambitions on the Old Continent. The United States is seen as being a constructive influence in European affairs by Europeans and even by the Soviet Union.

From all the unsettling activity that has taken place in Europe, if one were to attempt to synthesize key issues with which the U.S. Army senior leadership should concern itself, one finds two basic facts. First, within the European security

debate the role played by diplomacy, as opposed to military activities, has already grown and will increase over time. With the end of confrontation between the two blocs, it is only natural that all countries engaged in European affairs will actively position themselves diplomatically to secure greater prestige and influence. While there is nothing new about this particular aspect of state behavior, what will be different is that, in view of the diminished need for alliance solidarity, this type of behavior will increase and become very much the norm, as opposed to the exception. Therefore, the United States can expect greater independence on the part of our European allies and more public *contres* over such issues as competition for economic markets and political influence in the reforming non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. While an increase in this kind of diplomatic activity will not in itself destroy the alliance, it will make finding consensus more difficult.

Second, it is not going too far to state that a crucial factor concerning the continued stability in Europe and to the favorable outcome of change on the Old Continent from the Western perspective comes down to spreading the common defense burden in the alliance so as to end, as quickly as practical, any vestiges of the Federal Republic being singularized. In the sagacious words of Sir Michael Howard, "There is a German Problem. It may be only a problem of perception, but it exists nonetheless."¹⁰⁹ A country that will be a world power in its own right within the emerging pseudo-superpower, the European Community, will be permanently influential in the European security and diplomatic calculi. A Europe without a U.S. military presence would likely produce a Western Alliance dominated by Germany; clearly an eventuality that is presently unacceptable to its neighbors. That the responsibility of the United States to be the insuring agent, so to speak, of the continued Western orientation of Germany is essential and without doubt, especially when one considers the result of America's abdication of its political and security roles in Europe following the end of the First World War.

In brief, the future for a U.S. Army role in Europe is assured, but only if it is capable of transforming itself in order to be

prepared for Europe's altered security and political realities. Given its formidable technological capabilities and trained personnel, the U.S. Army is singularly well-suited to play a constructive role in the current potentially unsettled period, as well as after the new European security balance crystallizes. While admittedly U.S. naval and air assets will also have important missions to perform, Europe's historical and future central security concern will be the continued sanctity of borders, an imperative secured only by ground forces. In short, ships and aircraft may come and go and are subject to the impulsive political vicissitudes of the day; armies are stuck to the ground on which they are stationed and cannot be easily removed, *or withheld*, in a crisis.

In order to accomplish these new missions, however, cold war force deployments and structures need to change if the U.S. Army is to succeed in carrying out its new political mission. In preparing for this heightened political environment, a new type of officer must evolve. U.S. Army officers serving in Europe need to understand and appreciate the politically-sensitive roles they play. In an ambiguous external threat environment where the rationale for a foreign troop presence is, *inter alia*, to maintain the status quo, comprehensive knowledge of the political mission will equal tactical and operational level military expertise. This new role will require rigorous education in European regional and domestic politics, arms control agreements, and true foreign language proficiency. Junior and field grade officers (let alone general officers) incapable of articulating the political role and security mission of their service in the language of the host nation in which they are serving could be a potential liability to both the U.S. Army and their country's interests.

While such a scenario might be seen as an anathema to many in the U.S. Army, it should be recalled that military forces do indeed serve political ends. The cold war and the immediacy of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe allowed the U.S. military in general to focus intensely for almost 45 years on operational concerns (ie., warfighting), often at the expense of bearing in mind the inherent political mission they

perform.¹¹⁰ The juxtaposition of, for instance, the politically ambivalent U.S. Army and the politically aware, if not obsessed, German *Bundeswehr* is telling in this respect. Nevertheless, the U.S. armed services could learn from the *Bundeswehr* in regard to the political mission defense forces must play in a democracy, let alone when stationed in an allied country. Former German Defense Minister Rupert Scholz expressed himself succinctly on this issue: "Leadership and civic education in the *Bundeswehr* are an expression of a democratic and humane relationship to duty. They are absolutely indispensable for officers and for soldiers."¹¹¹ Political awareness, therefore, is not a matter of understanding and practicing political intriguing; rather, it is the educated appreciation of the underlying role armed forces must play in a democracy and within an alliance of like-minded states.

Whether one likes it or not, a unified Germany will take some time before it is truly accepted by its neighbors as unthreatening in a historically sensitive continent with long collective memories. Fortunately for the West, the Federal Republic shows every intention of maintaining its unassailable democratic traditions and remaining closely involved in the European integration process. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the U.S. Army would be required to play the important politically sensitive role of ensuring the continuation of benign German intentions toward Europe, as well as maintaining vigilance against any external threats to Western Europe. In sum, the domestic political sensitivities of the Federal Republic concerning the presence of large numbers of foreign troops, too often concentrated in urban areas and incessantly exercising, do not combine well with the evolving roles developed in this study. Changes are required in the U.S. Army force structure, posture and even corporate attitudes.

Observations and Recommendations.

- The United States must stay diplomatically active in Europe. This activity must be complemented, of course, by the maintenance of a military presence. There is no significant political force in Europe that advocates the

withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region. Diplomatic and military involvement in Europe will provide a crucial stabilizing influence on the Old Continent during the period in which a new security structure is built to replace existing cold war institutions.

- In view of the altered political climate in Europe, the U.S. Army must be proactive in changing its force and command and control structures to meet both its new security missions and the greater political role it will have to play. The Soviet threat, albeit still extant, has significantly decreased in its immediacy. One objective of U.S. forces in Europe will be to ensure the Federal Republic's continued benign intentions. By its very nature, this is a politically sensitive role and must be accomplished while retaining the capability for effective military operations, both in and outside of Europe.
- These new roles will require changes in existing military structure, as well as in the manner which the U.S. Army has historically approached its mission in Europe. Significantly, strong evidence suggests that some of our European allies have become aware of the need for the Western Alliance to be capable of responding to threats from the South. One way to sell a NATO strategy and capability for dealing with these operations would be to frame their development in terms of responding to potential threats on the flanks. *It is recommended that should this prove to be politically unacceptable to the alliance, the U.S. Army should take the lead in cultivating new and expanding existing bilateral initiatives with select allied nations who share our concerns (e.g., France, Italy, Britain).*
- Irrespective of the manner by which we garner European support for these envisaged contingencies, the U.S. Army must develop a greater airmobile response capability in theater. *It is, therefore, recommended that the Airborne Task Force in Italy be increased to brigade-size, making it an Air Cavalry*

Brigade. This change in force structure would support the intent of the proposed CFE accord (i.e., reducing armor forces) and would provide the United States with an ameliorated capacity to respond quickly to events in and outside of theater.

- Remaining U.S. forces in the Federal Republic should be reorganized within multinational corps formations. Forming these units would result in financial savings, and make U.S. forces less visible and therefore more politically acceptable. The creation of multinational corps would ensure that an acceptable level of interoperability would be retained and possibly build consensus for operations outside of NATO's immediate area. They could also become crucial in the medium-to long term should the European political situation necessitate further defense integration, possibly to include the organization of multinational divisions, comprised of independent national brigades, and possibly stationed throughout the alliance. The alliance could have little other choice but to opt for multinational divisions, stationed in other allied countries, if that is the price to be paid to obviate the singularization of the Federal Republic. *It is recommended that the Army Staff immediately initiate staff processes to study the challenges involved in participating in these formations.* Should the conclusion be reached that U.S. Army participation in defense integration is unacceptable at this level, other equally politically constructive alternatives to our European allies should be proposed.
- Given the prevailing sensitivities in the Federal Republic and the provisions of future arms control treaties and CSBMs accords, it is likely that holding major field exercises will become increasingly unattractive. *It is recommended that the U.S. Army should, therefore, shift most of its field exercises to North America and actively invite its allies to utilize its substantial and highly sophisticated facilities.* This will allow the U.S. Army to maintain many existing exercise areas as it shrinks over

time. This move would also greatly contribute to maintaining interoperability and allowing Washington to influence in a passive way the type of threats against which our allies train.

- The U.S. Army must learn to conduct its missions in Europe in an environment regulated by arms control treaties (e.g., CFE), intrusive verification regimes and operational limitations as specified by CSBMs. These agreements and arrangements will be crucial to obtaining Western security interests in the future in Europe and should be championed by the U.S. Army. To be effective, however, the Army needs to expand its educational program in the area of the explicit and subtle provisions of arms control treaties and CSBMs. *It is recommended that the U.S. Army War College should be tasked to develop a comprehensive arms control education program for use at that institution, as well as in the Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and at the Command and General Staff College. It is further recommended that officers assigned to Europe would be required to demonstrate proficiency in these areas prior to posting.*
- Within the context of changing the structure and roles of the U.S. Army in Europe will be the ever-present uncertainty over the future foreign policy ambitions of a unified Germany. All evidence overwhelmingly suggests unified Germany will remain strongly oriented toward the West and embedded in an economic and increasingly politically integrated Western Europe. Nonetheless, the Army leadership needs to be aware of European sensitivities concerning Germany. Moreover, in view of the diminishing Soviet threat and the requirement to maintain U.S. forces in the Federal Republic, junior, field grade and general officers must soon be able to articulate in public their political and security missions in the host nation. *It is recommended that a comprehensive study of the successful manner in which the Bundeswehr has trained its personnel in*

these skills ("Innere Fuehrung") could provide important lessons to guide U.S. Army education programs. The insistence by the Bundeswehr that its general staff officers have demonstrable foreign language proficiency is another characteristic which the U.S. Army would do well to emulate.

- The unification of the two Germanies and the integration of some *Nationale Volksarmee* personnel into *Bundeswehr* raises a number of significant security and political issues which should be of concern to the U.S. Army. While there is every indication that this process of integration and security planning for eastern Germany is proceeding without major difficulty, many current and future questions remain. *It is recommended that the Army Staff initiate a study program to investigate the possible problematic aspects that may result from this process of integration.*
- The U.S. Army's future as an important element of U.S. policy toward Europe is assured. It is well-suited for future political roles and defense missions, especially if U.S. SNFs are withdrawn and the residual U.S. Army presence must make credible the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe. However, in order to accomplish these new operational and political challenges, force structure, officer education and institutional attitudes need to change.

ENDNOTES

1. See, *The Washington Post*, September 16, 1990, where NATO is criticized for being irrelevant to Third World contingencies, as seen from the perspective of the Iraqi crisis. Cf., Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, who argues *passim*, that the alliance has been very successful over the years meeting out-of-area threats on an *ad hoc* basis.
2. See, Ronald Steel's essay in *The New York Times*, June 28, 1990. Steel's arguments are handily countered by Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," *Survival*, Volume 32 (2), March-April 1990, pp. 99-106.
3. See, Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the German Question," *Survival*, Volume 32 (4), July-August 1990, pp. 291-298.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
5. This comparison is described by Clifford and Charles Kupchan in *The New York Times*, July 6, 1990.
6. Cf., *The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 2, 1990; and, *The New York Times*, September 20, 1990.
7. See, *The Washington Post*, December 8, 1989.
8. For an analysis of France's policy toward the German unification issue see, Walter Schuetze, "Frankreich angesichts der deutschen Einheit," *Europa Archiv*, Volume 45 (4), February 1990, pp. 133-138; and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 19, 1990.
9. For an assessment of these forces and modernization proposals see, Francois Heisbourg, "The British and French Nuclear Forces. *Survival*, Volume 31 (4), July-August 1989, pp. 301-320.
10. See, *The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 2, 1990.
11. See, *The Washington Post*, July 2, 1990.
12. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher being a prime opponent of the stationing of nuclear forces in Germany. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 14, 1990. He has received unexpectedly strong support

on this issue from Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 11, 1990.

13. The different options for managing the German Question are dealt with in Hoffmann, "Reflections on the German Question."

14. See, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), November 20, 1989.

15. See NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner's comments in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 28, 1990.

16. This point was strongly endorsed by German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), August 12, 1990.

17. Josef Joffee, "Once More: the German Question," *Survival*, Volume 32 (2), March-April 1990, p. 138.

18. See, *ADN International Service* (Berlin), October 12, 1990 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-90-198*, October 12, 1990, p. 5.

19. For an assessment of the security challenges which face these states see, Jeffrey Simon, ed., *NATO, The Warsaw Pact and European Security*, Washington: National Defense University Press, forthcoming, *passim*.

20. The conflict in the Persian Gulf has evidently hardened the European Parliament's position toward accepting neutrals into the community. See, *Die Presse* (Vienna), September 11, 1990.

21. See, *The Washington Post*, September 11, 1990.

22. For the Soviet view on the CSCE process see, *Pravda* (Moscow), June 29, 1990 (Second Edition) in, *FBIS-SOV-90-159*, August 16, 1990, pp. 3-5.

23. See, *Hilversum International Service*, June 30, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-128*, July 3, 1990, p. 1.

24. See, for example, *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), June 29, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-131*, July 9, 1990, p. 3; and, *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1990.

25. "The Bundeswehr has been conceived as an army in the Alliance and not as an instrument for independent military power projection on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany...Therefore, the fighting units of the Bundeswehr, with the exception of some units of the Territorial Army, are intended to be placed under the operational control of NATO." See,

White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, Bonn: the Federal Minister of Defence, 1985, p. 72.

26. It is interesting to note that despite the current detente between NATO and the Soviet Union, it has been reported in the press that Moscow has greatly increased its espionage activity in the West. See, *Sueddeutscher Zeitung* (Munich), August 22, 1990.

27. See, *Soviet Military Power, 1990*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 51-54.

28. See statement of Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Rethinking NATO in a Europe Whole and Free," *Defense Issues*, Volume 5 (28), May 9, 1990, p. 2.

29. Christopher Donnelly, "The Development of Soviet Military Policy in the 1990s," *RUSI Journal*, Volume 135 (1), Spring 1990, pp. 14-15.

30. See excerpts from the Kohl-Gorbachev Zheleznovodsk news conference in *The New York Times*, July 17, 1990; and, the text of *The Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany*, September 12, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-177-U*, September 12, 1990, pp. 3-6, particularly Articles 3 and 5.

31. Cf., comments by Stoltenberg and Genscher in *DPA* (Hamburg), May 15, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-094*, May 15, 1990, pp. 18-19; and, *ADN International Service* (East Berlin), July 18, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-139*, July 19, 1990, p. 11.

32. For an excellent and brief analysis of the CFE negotiations see, *Vienna, Disarmament and Western European Security*, Report, Document 1223, Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, April 14, 1990.

33. See, Jonathan Dean, "The CFE Negotiations, Present and Future," *Survival*, Volume 32 (4), July-August 1990, p. 316.

34. See, Jim Hoagland's essay on the Bonn-Moscow connection in *The Washington Post*, July 19, 1990.

35. For an excellent study of the fall from grace of the Atlanticist School in West German foreign policy see Clay Clements, "Beyond INF: West Germany's Center-Right Party and Arms Control," *International Affairs*, Volume 65 (1), Winter 1988/89, pp. 54-74.

36. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 10, 1980; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, February 26, 1989; *Der Spiegel*, (16) (1989), pp. 15-16; (17) (1989), pp. 14-16; (18) (1989), pp. 23-27; and, (23) (1990), p. 16.

37. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 183-184. Note that the informal "alliance" among the Anglo-Saxon partners of the West appears to have the necessary requirements to constitute ideological solidarity. See, Thomas-Durell Young, *Supporting Future U.S. Alliance Strategy: The Anglo-Saxon or "ABCA" Clue*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990.

38. Cf., NATO Secretary-General Woerner's comments in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 28, 1990.

39. See, *Vienna, Disarmament and Western European Security*; and, Dean, "The CFE Negotiations."

40. See, William D. Bajusz and Lisa D. Shaw, "The Forthcoming 'SNF Negotiations,'" *Survival*, Volume 32 (4), July-August 1990, pp. 333-347.

41. See, *Strategic Survey*, 1989-1990, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990, pp. 194-201.

42. See, James Eberle, "Global Security and Naval Arms Control," *Survival*, Volume 32 (4), July-August 1990, pp. 325-332.

43. See, *Geneva and Vienna*, Draft Interim Report Part I, Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, Subcommittee on Confidence and Security Building Measures, May 1990, pp. 10-18.

44. See *ZDF Television Network* (Mainz), August 27, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-167*, August 28, 1990, p. 15; and, *The Future of Low Flying*, Report, Document 1222, Paris: Assembly of the Western Union, April 24, 1990.

45. For background information on verification in a possible CFE accord see, Volker Kunzendorff, "Verification in Conventional Arms Control," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 245, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

47. See, comments by General Galvin to the *Wall Street Journal* editorial staff in, *ACE Output*, Volume 9 (3), August 1990, pp. 13-14.

48. Sam Nunn, "The Changing World Scene: Challenges to NATO in the 1990s," *Survival*, Volume 32 (1), January-February 1990, pp. 9-10.

49. Strobe Talbott. *Deadly Gambits*. New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 323.

50. See, *Geneva and Vienna* for background on Rounds III, IV, and VI.

51. The plenary statements of the conference are available in four volumes entitled, *Seminar on Military Doctrine*, Wien: Institut fuer Militaerische Sicherheitspolitik an der Landesverteidigungsakademie, March 1990.

52. See, *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1990; and, *The New York Times*, May 24, 1990.

53. See, *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), June 12, 1990.

54. Gorbachev made this call during his speech to the United Nations in December 1988. See, *The Washington Post*, December 8, 1988.

55. Robert Grant, "French Defense Policy and European Security," in *French Security Policy: From Independence to Interdependence*, ed. by Robbin F. Laird, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 12.

56. See, Vienna, *Disarmament and Western European Security*; and, Dean, "The CFE Negotiations."

57. See, Simon, *NATO, Warsaw Pact and European Security, passim*; and, *Strategic Survey, 1989-1990*, pp. 38-51.

58. See, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (foreign edition), March 25, 1990.

59. See, for example, Malcolm Chambers, "Beyond the Alliance System," *World Policy Journal*, Volume 7 (2), Spring 1990, pp. 215-250.

60. For an excellent analysis of the European neutrals' security policies and problems see, Joseph Kruzel, "The European Neutrals, National Defense, and International Security," *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 8 (3), 1989, pp. 297-315.

61. *Sub-Committee on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, May 1990, p. 13.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Peter Coterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?", *Survival*, Volume 32 (2), March-April 1990, p. 147.

64. Luebkemeier is correct in his statement that NATO is unsuited, as an organization, for missions such as economic and political development. See, Eckhard Luebkemeier, *The Future of NATO*, paper presented to the Swedish Defence Research Symposium, Department of Defence Analysis, Stockholm, June 11-13, 1990, p. 8.

65. See, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The European Pillar: the American View," in "The Changing Strategic Landscape I," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 235, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1989, pp. 91-105; and, Donald J. Attwood's address to the WEU Assembly in, Official Report of the Fifth Sitting of the Western European Union Assembly, A/WEU (36) CR5, June 7, 1990, pp. 2-16.

66. See, Jacques Delors' comments in, *Paris Domestic Service*, September 16, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-180*, September 17, 1990, p.18.

67. See, President of the WEU's Assembly, Robert Pontillon in, *Le Monde* (Paris), July 11, 1990; and, *The New York Times*, August 21, 1990.

68. See, *Information Report*, Paris, Assembly of the Western European Union, April 11, 1990, pp. 13; 25-26; 31-33.

69. See, *Observation Satellites - A European Means of Verifying Disarmament - Guidelines Drawn from the Symposium*, Report, Paris, Western European Union Assembly, May 25, 1990; and, the interview with Jean-Pierre Fourre in *Spazio Informazioni* (Rome), April 4, 1990.

70. It is interesting to note that popular support of NATO has grown during 1990 in Denmark, a country not known for having strongly supported the alliance over the years. See, *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), June 28, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-158*, August 15, 1990, pp. 35-36.

71. See, *White Paper 1985*. Regarding the command and control of the *Bundeswehr* in the former territory of the Democratic Republic see, *DPA* (Hamburg), September 10, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-175-U*, September 10, 1990, p. 8. For air defense see, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), September 25, 1990, p. 8.

72. As advocated by Hoffman, "Reflections on the German Question," pp. 196-197.

73. See, Dominique David, *La Force d'action rapide en Europe: Le dire des armes*, Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense nationale, 1984.

74. See Carlo Jean, *Studi strategici*, Milano: Franco Angeli Libri, 1990, pp. 171-172.

75. See Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Spain's Security Policy and Army in the 1990s," *Parameters*, Volume 20 (2), June 1990, pp. 95-97.

76. As hinted by Robert Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly in, *Le Monde*, Paris, July 11, 1990.

77. See, *The Washington Post*, July 2, 1990.

78. See, *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1990.

79. See the German Social Democratic Party's security policy paper in *DPA* (Hamburg), April 25, 1990, in *FBIS-WEU-90-082*, April 27, 1990, p. 17.

80. For discussion of this issue see, W. R. Smyser, *Restive Partners: Washington and Bonn Diverge*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 36-39; 83-86.

81. See, Karl Kaiser, "Why Nuclear Weapons in Times of Disarmament?", *The World Today*, Volume 45 (8-9), August-September 1989, pp. 134-139.

82. See, Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*. London: Brassey's (UK), 1989, pp. 47-50.

83. See, *The Washington Post*, August 22, 1990.

84. See, *Aftenposten* (Oslo), September 13, 1990, *FBIS-WEU-90-182*, September 19, 1990, pp. 1-2.

85. For example, 40 MIG-27 aircraft, removed from Hungary in spring 1990, were reported to be relocated to the Kola Peninsula. "The main task of these planes is to attack targets from the rear, and their range makes it possible for them to reach targets throughout Norway from [their] bases..." *Aftenposten* (Oslo), June 15, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-132*, July 10, 1990, pp. 43-44. For a Turkish view see retired Admiral Tanju Erden's comments in, *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), April 15, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-130*, July 6, 1990, pp. 36-39.

86. See, *Aftenposten* (Oslo), October 26, 1990, *FBIS-WEU-90-221*. November 15, 1990, p. 36.

87. To include, surprisingly, the Federal Republic, see interview with Defense Minister Stoltenberg in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), August 30, 1990. For a conservative French view of Islamic threats from the South see Michel Debre's polemic in *Le Quotidien de Paris*, June 26, 1990. A more balanced, but forthright assessment of the possible future frictions between Christian Europe and the Islamic Near East is found in, *The Economist*, September 17, 1990, *Defence Survey*, pp. 4-7.

88. One of the missions of the French FAR is apparently the evacuation of "beleaguered nationals," and was recently practiced during the *Farfadet* exercise of April 1990. See, *Le Monde* (Paris), April 22-23, 1990.

89. See *The New York Times*, June 14, 1990.

90. See, *DPA* (Hamburg), August 11, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-156*, August 13, 1990, p. 3.

91. See, Henning von Ondarza, "The Army - The Transitional Phase: Historical Opportunities for Reorganization," *Europaeische Wehrkunde*, July 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-182-U*, September 19, 1990, p. 8.

92. Schloer argues that given the projected decrease in Western military personnel in Central Europe, existing doctrines and concepts remain valid only if complemented by increased mobility of forces. See Wolfgang Schloer, "Armaments and Arms Control: Assessing the Impact of Conventional Defense Programs on CFE," (paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, April 10-14, 1990), pp. 14-16.

93. Even the Social Democratic Party does not advocate the immediate or complete withdrawal of allied forces from the Federal Republic. See *DPA* (Hamburg), April 25, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-082*, April 27, 1990, p. 17. The economic consequences of a reduced U.S. presence in Germany has not been lost on many in that country, particularly in rural areas where allied forces provide substantial contributions to the local economy. See, *The New York Times*, May 10, 1990.

94. See, *The Economist*, May 23, 1990.

95. See, Heisbourg, "The British and French Nuclear Forces," pp. 315-318.

96. See, *The New York Times*, October 25, 1990.

97. For example, Egon Bahr of the SPD has recently argued that the special rights of allied forces in the Federal Republic should be canceled. See, *Deutschlandfunk* (Cologne), September 14, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-179-U*, September 14, 1990, p. 1.

98. Luebkemeier, "The Future of NATO," p. 8.

99. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), August 12, 1990.

100. See, Christian Millotat, "Der Baum traegt Fruechte," *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 34 (2), 1990, p. 127.

101. See Ian Gamble, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 244. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, pp. 22-23.

102. The example of the Minister President of Hesse, who has made a major issue of getting U.S. forces out of urban areas, is an excellent case

in point. For recent developments in this area see, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 4, 1990; and, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 24, 1990.

103. See, Guy Willis and Gerard Turbe, "Airmobile Formations—Shaping the Helicopter's Influence on the Land Battle," *International Defense Review*, Volume 23 (4), 1990, pp. 377-381; and, R. D. Grist, "Airmobile Forces in Central Europe," in *Seaford House Papers*, 1987, London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 1988, pp. 123-141.

104. See, Ian O. Lesser, *Changes in the Character of East-West Relations: Implications for NATO's Southern Strategy*, RAND Note N-3133-FF, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, June 1990, *passim*.

105. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), September 7, 1990.

106. See *DPA* (Hamburg) October 16, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-201*, October 17, 1990, pp. 10-11.

107. See, John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round," *The New Yorker*, August 27, 1990, p. 89.

108. *Ibid.*, *passim*.

109. Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," p. 105.

110. See, for example, Walter Mather, "Peace is not my Profession; Deterrence is not my Mission," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Volume 125 (11), June 1988, p. 78.

111. See, *Die Welt* (Bonn), July 10, 1990, in *FBIS-WEU-90-155-U*, August 10, 1990, p. 24.

APPENDIX A

PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL CORPS STRUCTURE¹

This proposed structure flows from the missions ACE will face as Europe's political geography undergoes a series of expected changes. The following proposed force realignment could conceivably evolve following the implementation of the CFE accord and national budgetary restrictions which will generate substantial reductions of standing NATO forces. This particular model assumes the elimination of both NATO Army Group headquarters (NORTHAG and CENTAG), with multinational corps reporting directly to the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) commander. It also reflects announced proposed reductions in allied forces in Europe. Each corps would vary in peacetime personnel strength from 55,000 to 70,000. While specific units designated for inactivation are identified, in a sense these proposals are notional. The conversion and standing down of units are offered here solely as evidence that the organization of these corps formations is militarily feasible and viable, in addition to being politically compelling. Finally, it is not necessary that identified allied formations need to be forward deployed *in toto*. What is key is the presence of their "flags," initial covering force and main logistic infrastructure for the wartime deployment of these and follow on divisions should the need arise.

The Baltic Approaches should be reassigned from Allied Forces Northern Europe to AFCENT. COMLANDJUT is already a multinational corps with the 6th German Infantry Division and the Danish Army's Mechanized Jutland Division, reinforced in time of crisis by the U.S. Army's 9th Motorized Brigade and the British Army's 1st Infantry Brigade. Given the movement of the threat away from the defunct Inter-German

Border, it is reasonable that this force be reduced in size and reoriented to screen the Baltic coast of eastern Germany in an emergency. The German 6th Division and the Danish Jutland Division should each incorporate an airmobile brigade to cover the significant distances involved in this command's mission. The British Army's 1st Infantry Brigade and the U.S. Army's 9th Motorized Brigade should be reallocated to the Central Region, reducing the nationalities involved in the defense of the the Baltic approaches and reducing the corps' logistic complexity.

Another multinational corps could be formed through the consolidation of the British and German I corps. Units assigned to this formation would be the British Army's 3rd and 4th Armoured divisions and the German 3rd and 7th Armored divisions. Each of the British divisions would retain two brigades in Germany and one in the United Kingdom (1st and 19th brigades). The operational mission of this corps would be to reinforce German Territorial forces in eastern Germany north of Berlin in an emergency, serving as a mobile reserve to repel attacks via the Szczecin axis. Corps command could be rotated between Britain and Germany. This formation assumes the withdrawal of Britain's 1st Armoured Division and the Dutch Army's 41st Armored Brigade from Germany. It also assumes inactivation of the German 11th Armored Infantry Division and relocation of the German 1st Armored Divison to eastern Germany.

Netherland's I corps could serve as a second echelon of reinforcement in an emergency. Its components would be the Dutch Army's 1st and 4th Armored Infantry divisions and the 101st Infantry Brigade. These formations would be reinforced in a crisis by the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry and 4th Mechanized Infantry divisions and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment based in the United States, and having prepositioned equipment POMCUSed in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The force would deploy in a crisis behind the British/German Corps as a mobile reserve in depth north of Berlin. Headquarters U.S. III Corps Forward would be consolidated with Headquarters Netherland's I Corps to form the multinational command. Corps command in this formation

could also be on a rotational basis, alternating between American and Dutch commanders. For missions outside of Europe and general mobilization, Headquarters III Corps, located at Fort Hood, should be kept intact as a national command. In a war involving NATO, III Corps could deploy its active component divisions to the U.S./Dutch corps and then assume command of mobilized National Guard heavy divisions.

It is assumed that Belgian I Corps will be withdrawn from the Federal Republic.² Because of the scarcity of facilities in Belgium, it is likely that most of the corps will be inactivated, as predicted by Robert Ulin.³ What is likely to remain in Belgium's active inventory is the 1st and 7th Mechanized brigades and the Paracommndo Regiment. If the 4th and 17th Brigades are reconstituted in the reserves on their withdrawal from Germany, it would be prudent for Belgium to retain its corps structure but with two divisions, each composed of one active and two reserve brigades. The revised structure would substantially simplify Belgium's defense establishment, reduce its cost, and improve its viability. It is probable that France will withdraw most of its forces from Germany and inactivate two divisions. In a crisis, return of French II Corps to Germany, accompanied by its assumption of operational command of a German division based in west-central Germany, would give greater substance to Franco-German military cooperation than the token brigade now in existence. Adding Belgium's corps to the First French Army would strengthen the latter and make both forces more viable. The First French Army would remain under French command in peacetime and chop to AFCENT in an emergency as a dedicated reinforcement for central, or southern, Germany. Employment of the entire First French Army in central Germany as an AFCENT reserve force in an emergency would array NATO forces in depth, providing flexibility to cover the mountain approaches from the Czech and Slovak Republic if that country is again invaded by the Soviets.

Another multinational corps would be formed through consolidation of the U.S. Seventh Army and German III corps.

Assigned units would be the U.S. Army's 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the 2nd Armored Cavalry regiment, and the German 4th and 8th Armored Divisions. This corps' operational mission would be to reinforce German Territorial forces located southeast of Berlin along the Bautzen and Cottbus approaches in an emergency and to screen passes through the Sudeten Mountains. This plan assumes the inactivation of the German 10th and 12th Armored divisions, relocation of the German 2nd Armored Division to Eastern Germany, and the withdrawal of the U.S. 3rd and 8th Infantry divisions and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, as well as part of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Command of this corps could rotate between the United States and the Federal Republic. Significantly, the corps support structure, except for personnel and select logistics functions, would be fully integrated, with U.S. and German elements under common operational control.

While it can be predicted that out-of-area operations will continue to be a contentious issue in NATO, given the growth in rapid reaction forces in some European countries it would be prudent for NATO to develop a formation amounting to an expanded version of SACEUR's ACE Mobile Force within which these forces could deploy, assuming the existence of a political mandate by their parent governments. Numerous Western European countries are far advanced in the development of forces for these types of contingencies. Such a multinational force could be formed around the nucleus of the French *Force d'Action Rapide*, a U.S. Army Air Cavalry Brigade (formed by expanding the Airborne Battalion Task Force in Italy with attack and assault transport helicopter battalions), the Italian Army's *Forza di Intervento Rapido*, the Spanish Army's *Fuerza de Accion Rapida*, the Portuguese Army's Airborne Brigade, the UK Mobile Force, the Belgian Paracommando Regiment, and battalion-sized commando contingents from Canada and the Netherlands. These forces would remain based within their home countries (with the exception of the U.S. contingent) and would be supported by air transport and close air support assets allocated for planning. Obviously, not all forces earmarked would be used for every contingency, but existence of the force would afford

SACEUR a wide range of units from which to tailor an appropriate response in order to demonstrate alliance resolve. An example of its use could be for peace-keeping operations in the Balkans. The SACEUR Reaction Force need only have a small planning and exercise staff headed possibly by a French commander which would exist in peacetime to serve as the essential foundation for emergency deployment.

While Eckhard Luebkemeier is correct in stating that NATO is ill-suited for nonsecurity and political roles⁴ (e.g., economic development missions in Central and Eastern Europe), it is capable of playing an active role in the important area of CSBMs in Europe. Thus, not all multinational forces would, by definition, need to be oriented toward combat missions. Indeed, a strong case could be made for the creation of a force specifically intended to convey a more cooperative NATO mission, both within, and possibly even outside of Europe. To that end, an on-call multinational force could be organized with contingents from all NATO members for disaster relief operations under the control of SACEUR. The force would include transportation, medical, engineer, and demolition units for use as disaster relief forces and possibly for environmental clean-up operations. Command could be rotated among the contributors to the force. Dedicated forces could remain based in their respective home countries, but would have air and sea transportation allocated for planning. The force could engage in annual cooperative disaster relief exercises with neutral and Eastern European countries, and possibly even in conjunction with the Soviet Union.

ENDNOTES

APPENDIX A

1. This proposed force structure is taken from, Thomas-Durell Young and Karl H. Lowe, *The Case for U.S. Participation in NATO Multinational Corps*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990. A version of this study appears in *Survival*, Volume 33 (1), January- February 1991.
2. Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme directed the Belgian Joint Staff in January 1990 to prepare plans for the return of the 1st Belgian Corps from the Federal Republic. See, *Jane's Defense Weekly*, February 3, 1990, p. 180.
3. See, Robert Ulin, "Belgium: A Time for Changing Priorities," in Simon, *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and European Security*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, forthcoming.
4. Eckhard Luebkemeier, "The Future of NATO," paper presented to the Swedish Defence Research Symposium, Department of Defence Analysis, Stockholm, June 11-13, 1990, p. 8.